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On December 12, 2000, the United States Supreme Court, for the 
first time in its history, picked a president.1  By shutting down the state-
-wide manual recount that had been ordered just days earlier by the 
Florida Supreme Court, the High Court Justices ensured that George 
W. Bush would become the forty-third president of the United States. 
in this essay, i shall speculate on the long-term implications of 
this controversial ruling for the Court’s institutional standing and legi-
timacy.  My strategy will be to canvas some of the landmark decisions 
in American constitutional history–Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 Brown v. 
Board of Education,3 Furman v. Georgia,4 Roe v. Wade,5 and others–with 
the aim of deriving a list of factors that predict how particular rulings 
will affect the Court’s reputation.  Then I shall consider how those 
variables apply to Bush v. Gore and predict that decision’s long-term 
consequences.
1 Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000). 
2 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
5  410 U.S. 13 (1973). 
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The premise of this Article is that history’s verdict on a Supre-
me Court ruling depends more on whether public opinion ultimately 
supports the outcome than on the quality of the legal reasoning or 
the craftsmanship of the Court’s opinion.  I do not intend to defend 
that premise here, other than to say that history’s judgment on Brown 
v. Board of Education–the ultimate feather in the Court’s constitutional 
cap–seems to confirm its plausibility.  The legal reasoning in Brown 
was widely ridiculed at the time, both by white southerners distrau-
ght over the threat posed by the decision to their cherished “way of 
life”6 and by elite legal academics and judges deeply invested in the 
enterprise of “reasoned elaboration.”7  The Brown Court’s dubious 
rendition of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, its willingness to overturn decades’ worth of precedent sustai-
ning the constitutionality of racial segregation, and its unprecedented 
invocation of sociological data in support of its legal conclusion ren-
dered the decision susceptible to criticism, both from defenders and 
supporters of racial segregation.8  Yet, over the course of ensuing 
decades, Brown became a cultural icon, and the Court’s vanguard role 
in the civil rights movement (at least relative to that of other govern-
mental institutions) has enormously enhanced its prestige among the 
American people.9  This conversion of Brown from a target of vitupe-
rative legal and sociopolitical criticism into a cultural icon may sug-
gest that the Court’s long-term standing depends more on getting its 
decisions right–by which I mean ruling in a manner consonant with 
long-term public opinion–than on the quality of its legal reasoning.
Of course, this premise may be mistaken.  The Justices them-
selves, for example, seem convinced of the opposite view–that the 
Court’s legitimacy depends on its ability to convince observers that its 
rulings are based on sound legal principle, rather than political calcu-
lation or personal preference.  Thus, in reaffirming the vitality of the 
6 See, e.g., Tom Brady, Black Monday (1955); James J. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (1962).
7 See, e.g., Learned Hand, The Bill of  Rights 55 (1958) (“I have never been able to understand on what basis it [Brown] 
does or can rest except as a coup de main.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of  Constitutional Law, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 32-34 (1959) (criticizing the Court in Brown for its failure to justify its result on any “neutral principle”). 
8 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 6-7; Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150 (1955).  See also Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1931 
(1995) (noting that in 1954 Brown “was not seen to be so obviously correct”). 
9 See, e.g, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 330 (1994) (stating that Brown “is universally approved as both 
right and necessary[;] . . . [m]ore powerful by far than any academic theory of  constitutional interpretation is the legend of  
Brown”).  For other similar statements, see the sources cited in Klarman, supra note __, at 1928 n. 125. 
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Court’s landmark abortion rights decision, Roe v. Wade, the plurality 
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey declared that “the underlying 
substance of [the Court’s] legitimacy is of course the warrant for the 
Court’s decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal 
principle on which the Court draws.”10  Further, the plurality stated, 
“a decision without principled justification would be no judicial act 
at all” and “[t]he Court must take care to speak and act in ways that 
allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims 
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with 
social and political pressures. . . .”11  Likewise, the plurality opinion in 
Bowers v. Hardwick observed that “[t]he Court is most vulnerable and 
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made cons-
titutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
design of the Constitution.”12
For the sake of the Court’s legitimacy, one must hope that the 
Justices are wrong about this, for it will be difficult to find reputable 
lawyers who believe that Bush v. Gore was “grounded truly in princi-
ple” or “in the language or design of the Constitution,” rather than in 
the conservative Justices’ partisan preference for George W. Bush in 
the 2000 presidential election.13
in the first part of this Article, i shall try to demonstrate that 
the Bush result can be explained only in terms of the conservative 
majority’s partisan political preferences.  Part II will consider the like-
ly impact of this ruling on the Court’s long-term institutional standing.
10 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
11 Id. 
12 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (plurality opinion).
13 For some representative critiques of  Bush, see Ronald Dworkin, “A Badly Flawed Election,” New York Review of  Books, 
Jan. 11, 2001, at 53 (calling Bush “one of  the least persuasive Supreme Court opinions that I have ever read”); Jeffrey 
Rosen, “Disgrace,” New Republic, Dec. 25, 2000, 18 (noting that the Justices, “by not even bothering to cloak their willful-
ness in legal arguments intelligible to people of  good faith who do not share their views, . . . made it impossible for citizens 
of  the United States to sustain any kind of  faith in the rule of  law. . .”); Anthony Lewis, “A Failure of  Reason: The Su-
preme Court’s Ruling isn’t Convincing,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 18, 2000, A-13 (judging the decision “a dismal failure,” 
judged by the standard of  providing “reasoned arguments,” and concluding that it “invites people to treat the court’s aura 
of  reason as an illusion”); Neal Katyal, “Politics over Principle,” Washington Post, Dec. 14, 2000, A35 (calling decision “law-
less and unprecedented”); J. Dionne Jr., “So Much for States’ Rights,” Washington Post, Dec. 14, 2000, A35 (accusing the 
majority of  “contort[ing] their own principles and creat[ing] new law”); Scott Turow, “No Turning Back neFrom the Dart 
the Court has Thrown,” Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2000, B1 (quoting Dean Terry Sandalow to the effect that the decision 
was “incomprehensible” and “an unmistakably partisan decision without any foundation in law”). 
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I. BuSh v. Gore: LAW OR POLITICS?
Just one day after the Court rendered its decision in Bush v. 
Gore, Justice Clarence Thomas appealed to a group of high school 
students visiting the Court not to attribute the ruling to the Justi-
ces’ partisan preferences: “I have yet to hear any discussion, in nine 
years, of partisan politics among members of the court.”1144  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, asked by the press to comment on Thomas’s re-
marks, agreed “absolutely” with his brethren’s statement.1155  it is an 
interesting question whether these two Justices genuinely believe 
their pretensions to nonpartisan decisionmaking.  Court watchers, 
possibly less in need of self-delusion, are likely to regard such claims 
as preposterous.
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to identify precisely what 
distinguishes Bush v. Gore from other cases of constitutional inter-
pretation.  Any serious student of constitutional law appreciates that 
political ideology necessarily influences constitutional interpretation. 
The text of the Constitution is so open-ended, and the debate over 
permissible sources of interpretation so inconclusive, that it is virtu-
ally impossible for a judge not to be influenced by political ideology 
when construing the Constitution.16  Thus, we should not be (and 
most of us are not) surprised when the Justices divide, along predic-
table political lines, when adjudicating the constitutionality of abor-
tion restrictions, school prayer, gay rights, affirmative action, minority 
voting districts, and a wide variety of federalism issues–just to name 
some of the more prominent constitutional disputes adjudicated by 
the Rehnquist Court.17
Yet, Bush v. Gore is importantly different from these other cons-
titutional cases.  It is one thing to say that a judge’s political ideology 
influences her constitutional interpretations.  it is quite another to say 
that her partisan political preferences do.  The Bush outcome was not a 
product of the conservative Justices’ political ideologies.  As we shall 
see, these Justices’ oft-professed commitment to federalism and to ju-
dicial restraint logically should have led them to the opposite result. 
14 Robert G. Kaiser, “Opinion is Sharply Divided on Ruling’s Consequences,” Washington Post, Dec. 14, 2000, A25. 
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of  Constitutional Evil, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 
1740 (1997). 
17 See cases cited infra notes __. 
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Rather, the Bush outcome was a product of these Justices’ partisan 
political preference for George W. Bush, which, for at least a couple 
of them, may have been enhanced by their desire to retire from the 
Court while a Republican President is in office to pick their replace-
ments.  Another way of stating the point is this: Had all the other facts 
in the Florida election imbroglio remained the same, but the situation 
of the two presidential candidates been reversed, does anyone se-
riously believe that the conservative Justices would have reached the 
same result?18  it is telling how even Republican commentators defen-
ding Bush generally have refrained from arguing for this conclusion.19 
This means that the result in Bush v. Gore depended on the or-
der in which the parties’ names appeared on the case caption.  This is 
extraordinary.  Every first year law student is taught that a minimum 
requirement of the rule of law is that the outcome of cases ought not 
to vary simply as a result of reversing the parties to the litigation.  it 
may simply be a failure of imagination, but i cannot think of another 
Supreme Court decision about which one can say with equal confi-
dence that switching the parties to the litigation, and nothing else, 
would have changed the result.
18  Republican defenders of  Bush probably would respond that the liberal Justices likewise voted their partisan political 
preferences.  Yet, it is not so clear that this is true.   First, two of  the Bush dissenters, Justices Souter and Stevens, were 
Republicans for most of  their adult lives, and for all we know still consider themselves to be such.  While both of  these 
Justices do evince liberal voting patterns in constitutional cases, it seems unjustified to assume that either or both of  them 
necessarily supported the Democratic presidential candidate in the 2000 election.  More importantly, it is unfair to the 
four dissenters to assume that they would have voted the opposite way had the parties been reversed.  The majority and 
dissenting opinions are similar in that each set of  Justices reached results that seem consistent with their partisan political 
preferences (on the dubious assumption, questioned above, that Souter and Stevens preferred Gore to Bush).  The two 
sets of  opinions are dissimilar, as I hope to show, in that the dissenters followed existing law, while the majority made up 
new (bad) law.  Under these circumstances, it seems a compelling inference that the Justices in the majority allowed their 
political preferences to trump the law.  It is far more dubious to infer that the dissenters followed their political preferences 
rather than the existing law.
19 Republican commentators defending the Court’s ruling have tended to emphasize that the Court saved the country 
from a constitutional crisis, or that it was Gore who initially invited judicial resolution of  the election controversy (and 
thus scarcely can be heard to complain when the Supreme Court provided that resolution), or that Democrats are hypo-
critical to complain of  judicial activism, which they invented.  See, e.g., Paul A. Gigot, “Liberals Discover the Tyranny of  
the Courts,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 15, 2000 (noting that “having turned the Supreme Court into a superlegislature, the 
left is now horrified to see what it’s created” and defending the decision on the ground that “it saved the country another 
month of  fighting before reaching the same result”); Charles Krauthammer, “Defenders of  the Law . . .,” Washington Post, 
Dec. 15, 2000, A41 (defending Bush on the ground that Democrats “turned this into a lawyers’ contest” and that the Court 
averted “a true constitutional crisis”); David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, “‘Right to Vote led Justices to Ruling,” Los 
Angeles Times, Dec. 14, 2000 (reporting the views of  lawyer Carter Phillips, who defended the result but not the reasoning 
of  Bush, and of  law professor John Yoo, who agreed with the result but was “surprised” by the equal protection rationale 
subscribed to by the five conservative Justices); Fred Barbash, “A Brand New Game,” Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2000, B1 
(conceding that the decision may have been “poorly reasoned” or attributable to “partisan motives,” but denying that this 
makes it “illegitimate,” and noting that Democrats frequently have embraced judicial activism).
Few conservative commentators have undertaken the onerous burden of  defending Bush on its merits.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half  Cheers for Bush v. Gore, U. Chi. L. Rev.  (forthcoming 2001). 
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if we broaden our perspective beyond constitutional litigation, 
however, an analogous instance does come to mind–the recent Clin-
ton impeachment episode.  Many observers plausibly concluded that 
the two parties’ positions on the substantive standard for impeach-
ment, as well as on related procedural issues, were entirely a product 
of their partisan commitments.  That is, had it been a Republican pre-
sident being impeached for identical behavior, the Democrats would 
have insisted on a lower threshold standard for impeachment, the 
desirability/necessity of the Senate pursuing an impeachment trial to 
its bitter end, and so forth. 
i think this is the right way to understand the Clinton 
impeachment,20  yet that still leaves one crucial distinction between 
that constitutional controversy and Bush v. Gore.  The constitutional 
law of impeachment is highly indeterminate.  The constitutional text 
is spare, the original intent evidence is conflicting and inconclusive, 
and precedents on impeachment are few and far between.21  Given 
this degree of constitutional indeterminacy, it was inevitable that par-
tisan preferences would drive post hoc constitutional interpretations 
regarding Clinton’s impeachment.  Bush v. Gore was importantly di-
fferent, because the constitutional law relevant to adjudicating that 
dispute was reasonably clear; the majority simply chose not to follow 
it. While the Clinton impeachment controversy illustrates partisan 
preferences dictating the resolution of constitutional indeterminacy, 
Bush v. Gore reveals partisan preferences trumping law.
This is a strong claim, though i believe it is one that virtually all 
Democratic lawyers, and a fair number of Republican ones, will agree 
with.  Let us now take a close look at the reasoning of the majority and 
concurring opinions in Bush to see if this serious charge is a fair one. 
The per curiam opinion, representing the views of the five con-
servative Justices, relies on two bases for its reversal of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision ordering a state-wide manual recount of 
presidential undervotes–those ballots for which the voting machines 
could not ascertain the voter’s intention, but a manual inspection 
might.  First, the majority rules that a manual recount of improperly-
20 See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 Va. L. Rev. 631, 654-55 
(1999) (arguing that, in light of  the “legal indeterminacy” surrounding impeachment, “it is natural and perhaps inevitable 
that the personal values of  the interpreters will determine legal outcomes”). 
21 See id. at 631-50. 
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-marked ballots, if conducted pursuant to standards no more precise 
than ascertaining the “intent of the voter,” would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is, primarily, 
because of the risk that identical ballots–from different counties or 
even from the same county–might be evaluated differently.22  Speci-
fically, punch card ballots with partially detached chads or indented 
chads might be counted by one counting team based on its inter-
pretation of the “intent of the voter” standard, but not by another 
applying a disparate interpretation.  Second, the majority ruled that 
a remand to the Florida Supreme Court for an opportunity to devise 
more precise, uniform standards to guide the manual recount, which 
might alleviate any equal protection concerns, was impossible becau-
se of looming time constraints.  Specifically, Bush v. Gore was handed 
down roughly two hours before midnight on December 12–the day 
on which resolution of the election contest had to be completed, if 
Florida’s slate of presidential electors was to enjoy the “safe harbor” 
from congressional challenge afforded by federal statute.  Neither 
aspect of the majority opinion is persuasive. 
The majority’s equal protection rationale creates entirely new 
law.23  Never before had the Supreme Court (and perhaps not any 
other court either) intimated that application of a vague statutory 
standard like “intent of the voter” in a manual recount (or any other 
vote count, for that matter) violated the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause of the risk that identically-marked ballots might be counted 
differently.24  Of course, to say that Bush v. Gore creates new equal 
protection law is not to say that it is wrong (except, of course, for 
Justice Scalia, who is on record as rejecting novel constitutional inter-
22 Bush v. Gore, slip opinion at 8-9.  This was not the only equality concern the majority raised.  The majority also suggested 
that limiting a manual recount to undervotes (and excluding overvotes) and using untrained personnel as vote counters 
raised equal protection concerns.   
23 The plethora of  states employing the “intent of  the voter” standard in a wide variety of  contexts, including manual 
recounts and the counting of  write-in and absentee ballots, no doubt were surprised to learn that they have been acting 
unconstitutionally all along.  For these state laws, see Bush, slip opinion at 3 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Brief  of  
Respondents, Bush v. Gore, at 36 (noting that before voting machines were invented, the “intent of  the voter” standard 
was universally employed). 
24 See Brief  of  Respondent, Bush v. Gore, at 44-45 (noting the prevalence of  the “intent of  the voter” standard and list-
ing numerous judicial decisions applying it).  It is worth pointing out that had the Florida Supreme Court prescribed a 
more specific formula for ascertaining the “intent of  the voter,” the conservative Justices probably would have ruled that 
the state court was changing state law and thus violating Article II.  See Bush v. Gore, slip opinion at 7 (refusing to decide 
whether the state supreme court had authority under state statute to prescribe a more specific standard for manually 
counting votes); see also Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1867628 (Fla.  2000) (per curiam) (noting that a more expansive defini-
tion “would have raised an issue as to whether this Court would be substantially rewriting the Code after the election”). 
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pretations that forbid longstanding practices).25  The Supreme Court 
often is called upon to resolve novel constitutional controversies, and 
inevitably on such occasions it creates new law.
The majority’s equal protection rationale is objectionable not 
because it represents new law, but rather because it represents bad 
law–and law that the conservative Justices almost certainly would 
have rejected in any other setting.  if it violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to conduct a manual recount under a vague standard 
that might result in identical ballots being counted differently, then 
certainly it should be unconstitutional to use different ballot designs 
or different ballot-reading technologies, if these yield substantially 
different likelihoods of a particular vote being counted.26  Studies 
have shown that undervotes were five times more likely in Florida 
counties using punch-card ballots than in those using more modern, 
optical-scan ballots.27  Similarly, a potentially confusing “butterfly” 
ballot employed by Palm Beach County led to a much higher-than-
-normal rate of presidential overvotes, as did ballots in other counties 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rutan v. Republican Party of  Illinois, 
497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26 Justice Souter, who disagreed with most aspects of  the majority and concurring opinions, agreed that standardless 
manual recounts were “wholly arbitrary,” and thus unconstitutional.  Bush, slip opinion at 7 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Un-
like the majority, Souter did proffer an explanation for why standardless recounts were constitutionally distinct from the 
use of  disparate voting mechanisms likely to yield different rates of  nonvotes.  Souter argued that local variety in the use 
of  voting technology could be justified on the grounds of  cost concerns, the desire for experimentation, and so forth. 
Standardless manual recounts, on the other hand, were simply arbitrary.  While Souter purports to find the Florida manual 
recount unconstitutional on the basis of  a minimum rationality standard, this is not the way that standard generally has 
been applied by the Court.  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf  Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  It is not hard to conjure possible explanations for a court (or legislature) to decline to specify 
standards more specific than “the intent of  the voter” to guide a manual recount.  First, the same value in experimentation 
that Souter identifies with regard to voting machines seems to apply in the context of  vote tabulation standards.  The best 
way to decide upon the optimal standard might be for different counties to experiment with different standards and then 
compare notes.  Second, “local variety” also might justify leaving it to county canvassing boards to use their discretion in 
defining more precise standards.  It is easy to imagine the desirability of  applying a different standard in evaluating ballot 
markings in precincts with lots of  elderly voters, who might experience greater difficulty punching out chads.  This sort 
of  imagined justification is all that minimum rationality review generally requires.  See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if  any state of  facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it.”).   Finally, the Florida courts’ refusal to prescribe a more specific standard is compellingly justified by its desire 
not to transgress on the state legislature’s prerogatives with regard to the selection of  presidential electors.  For the state 
courts to have prescribed a standard more specific than the legislature’s “intent of  the voter” would have invited Supreme 
Court reversal on Article II grounds.  Under these circumstances, it was not “wholly arbitrary” for the Florida Supreme 
Court to refrain from prescribing more specific standards.
27 See Ford Fessenden, “Contesting the Vote: The Voting Machines,” New York Times, Dec. 1, 2000, A29.  See also Bush, 
slip opinion at 4 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that voters in counties with different voting machines arrived at the polls 
“with an uequal chance that their votes will be counted”); id. at 4 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the percentage 
of  nonvotes–undervotes and overvotes together–in Florida counties using punch card ballots was 3.92%, while the same 
rate in counties using optical scan systems was only 1.43%). 
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that listed presidential candidates on two separate pages.28  Moreo-
ver, these county-to-county disparities in presidential undervotes and 
overvotes were correlated with race; heavily black precincts across 
Florida were more likely to use antiquated voting equipment, which 
substantially increased the chances of ballots failing to register a vote 
in the presidential election.29  One principal objective of the court-
-ordered manual recount in Florida was the amelioration of these 
other inequalities that resulted from the use of disparate voting tech-
nologies in different counties.30  Yet, the Bush majority does not deign 
to explain why these other ostensible equal protection problems do 
not invalidate the entire Florida presidential election vote (or, for that 
matter, the entire nationwide presidential election, given that other 
states exhibit the same lack of uniformity in the way they conduct 
presidential elections).31  All the majority says with regard to these 
seemingly analogous equal protection difficulties is that its holding is 
limited to “the special instance of a statewide recount under the au-
thority of a single state judicial officer”32 and that “[t]he question befo-
re the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their ex-
pertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections.”33 
Why was that question not before the Court?  Well, because “[o]ur 
consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem 
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many 
complexities.”34  So much for the requirement that courts engage in 
“reasoned elaboration.”35  No interpretation of the Equal Protection 
28 See, e.g., Dan Keating, “Democrats Had Most Voided Votes in Fla.,” Washington Post, Jan. 27, 2001, A1; Theodore M. 
Porter, “It’s Not in the Numbers,” Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2000, B1.  See also Jeffrey Rosen, “Speed Kills Misjudge,” 
New Republic, Nov. 27, 2000, 17 (noting that Bush’s equal protection argument would render the butterfly ballot uncon-
stitutional). 
29 See John Mintz, “Florida Ballot Spoilage Likelier for Blacks,” Washington Post, Dec. 3, 2000, A1; David Montgomery, 
“Simmering Election Anger Incites Rights Leaders,” Washington Post, Jan. 5, 2001, A10; see also Keating, supra note __ 
(noting that Republican-leaning counties were more likely to use modern vote-counting technology that reduces the likeli-
hood of  overvotes by alerting voters of  the problem before they have left the voting booth).
30 See Bush, slip opinion at 3-4 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Rosen, supra note __ (“By preventing states from correct-
ing the counting errors that result from different voting technologies, the conservatives have precipitated a violation of  
equal treatment far larger than the one they claim to avoid.”)
31 See, e.g., Savage & Weinstein, supra note __ (quoting law professor David Cole to the effect that the majority’s equal 
protection rationale means that “every state electoral system in the country is in violation,” and reporting law professor 
Pamela Karlan making a similar point). 
32 Bush, slip opinion at 10. 
33 Id. at 11. 
34 Bush, slip opinion at 10-11. 
35 For this notion, see, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
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Clause that makes it impossible to conduct elections can be a sensi-
ble one; the majority’s rationale in Bush does just that.
The Court’s equal protection rationale was so novel and far-fe-
tched that Bush’s lawyers came exceedingly close not even bothering 
to raise it.36  When they did, moreover, it was treated very much as 
an afterthought, receiving less than two sentences of attention at the 
very end of a forty-five page brief in the Florida Supreme Court.3377 
I do not mean to suggest that a lawyer’s failure to raise a particular 
legal argument, or her decision to raise it almost as an afterthought, 
proves that the argument is a bad one.  Lawyers, like everyone else, 
sometimes make mistakes and miscalculations.  Still, there is a sense 
in which the ex ante calculation of lawyers as to what qualifies as 
a good legal argument is more revealing than the Court’s post hoc 
determination.  The Supreme Court enjoys such immense prestige 
that the conclusion by a majority of Justices that “x” is a good legal 
argument almost conclusively proves it to be so.38  Yet, unless we are 
to stipulate that the Court is not only “final” but also “infallible,”3399 it 
must be that the Justices occasionally vindicate bad legal arguments. 
Because of this tendency of Supreme Court decisions retrospectively 
to validate the arguments upon which they are based, the ex ante 
judgments of lawyers–at least highly proficient ones, possessed of 
adequate incentives to raise all credible arguments–may be more 
reliable indicia of what counted as a good legal argument at a parti-
cular point in time than are the Court’s post hoc determinations.  In 
this same sense, the nearly-universal conclusion of legal academics 
and political pundits, before the Supreme Court granted review on 
the second go-round in Bush, that no serious federal question existed 
indicates how far-fetched the ultimately victorious equal protection 
Application of  Law 164-70 (tentative ed. 1958); Wechsler, supra note __, at 11-12, 15-17. 
36 See James V. Grimaldi & Roberto Suro, “Risky Bush Legal Strategy Paid Off,” Washington Post,  Dec. 17, 2000,  A32 
(noting that the equal protection argument was “initially thought so weak” that Bush’s lawyers thought it did not raise a 
substantial federal question).  See also David Von Drehle, “In Florida, Drawing the Battle Lines,” Washington Post, Jan. 29, 
2001, A1 (noting serious divisions within the Bush camp and among Republican lawyers more generally as to whether the 
equal protection argument was even worth raising). 
37 See Amended Brief  of  Appellees, Gore v. Harris (Supreme Court of  Florida, Case No. SC00-2431), p. 45.  See also 
Brief  of  Respondents, Bush v. Gore, 35 (noting that petitioners raised their equal protection challenged to standardless 
recounts in just “one throwaway line” in the state supreme court).
38 See, e.g., Michael Perry, The Authority of  Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of  Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 551, 566 (1985) (“[Just] about any choice a majority of  the Supreme Court is likely to make would probably 
fall within [the] boundary [set by] accepted canons of  judicial behavior, even in conjunction with the constitutional text.”). 
39 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,  J., concurring).
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argument was.40  Given the skepticism that these same conservative 
Justices elsewhere have evinced toward equal protection challenges 
to state political processes,41 their willingness to intervene in Bush 
would not have been easy to predict.
Even after the majority identified an equal protection problem 
with the “standardless” recount, however, the ordinary remedy would 
have been to remand the case to the Florida Supreme Court, to afford 
it an opportunity to cure the problem.  instead, the per curiam opi-
nion concluded that such a remedy would be pointless, since the 
December 12 “deadline” for resolving Florida’s election contest was 
immediately at hand.42  The Court manufactured this deadline out of 
thin air.  The federal statute identifying December 12 as a relevant 
date in the presidential election process plainly is a “safe harbor” 
provision, to be utilized or ignored by the states at their discretion; it 
operates as an instruction to Congress, when that institution counts 
the states’ electoral votes, not as a command to the states, to be en-
forced by the federal courts.43  Nothing in federal law requires that 
a state’s presidential electors be appointed until the date set for the 
electors to meet and cast their votes (December 18, on the 2000 
election calendar).  The majority opinion does not dispute this point. 
Rather, it reads the Florida Supreme Court decision under review as 
declaring the state legislature’s intention to take advantage of this 
federal safe harbor provision.  Thus to remand Bush to the state court 
would have been pointless, according to the majority, since under 
40 See, e.g., William Kristol & Jeffrey Ball, “Against Judicial Supremacy,” Weekly Standard, Dec. 4, 2000, 10 (noting that 
“[i]t would . . . be a mistake . . . for Bush to put too much hope in the federal courts” because “[m]ost GOP-appointed 
judges will vote as federalists, for the right of  states to prevail on election law,” and thus will reject the equal protection 
argument); Charles Lane, “Bush’s Appeal to High Court Raises Issue of  Fairness,” Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2000 (“Even 
Republican lawyers who sympathize with Bush’s case express doubt about the Bush campaign’s [equal protection] claim.”); 
Editorial, “The Election Road Narrows,” New York Times, A28 (noting, after the initial Supreme Court remand, that once 
the Florida Supreme Court revised its ruling to address the Court’s Article II concern, “there is unlikely to be any federal 
issue that would warrant further review by the United States Supreme Court”); Charles Lane, “Territory is Uncharted for 
Court Action,” Washington Post, Nov. 10, 2000, A1 (describing the various state law disputes generated by the election and 
then noting that “[f]ederal law generally leaves the administration of  elections for federal office up to the states, so the 
matter is likely to be settled in Florida’s courts, with no ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.”).  See also Scott Turow, 
“No Turning Back From the Dart the Court has Thrown,” Washington Post, Dec. 17, 2000, B1 (noting that constitutional 
scholars “of  all stripes” had predicted that the Supreme Court would not get involved in the case).  
41 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143, 145, 158, 161 (1986) (O’Connor, J., with Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(warning against “the federal judiciary” becoming involved in “the most heated partisan issues,” denying that the Equal 
Protection Clause provides “a judicially manageable standard” for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims, and deny-
ing that “mainstream political parties” require federal judicial protection). 
42 Bush, slip opinion at 12. 
43 See Bush, slip opinion at 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the Florida Supreme Court’s own interpretation of state law any ma-
nual recount had to be completed by the December 12 deadline.44
One can only marvel at the disingenuousness of this conclu-
sion.  First, there is enormous irony in the Bush majority’s eagerness 
to defer entirely to the Florida court’s supposed conclusion regarding 
the significance of the December 12 safe harbor deadline under state 
election law.  Three members of that majority could identify no other 
aspect of the state court’s interpretation of state election law that 
warranted similar deference.  The majority’s posture on this issue is 
especially remarkable in light of the concurring Justices’ statement 
that, in light of Article II concerns, “the text of the election law itself, 
and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on in-
dependent significance.”45  The text of Florida election law does not 
say a word about the federal safe harbor provision.
Second, to the extent that the Florida Supreme Court did em-
phasize in its opinion the significance of the December 12 deadline,4466 
it plainly was responding to the Supreme Court’s earlier intervention 
in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,47 which essentially had 
coerced the Florida court, upon threat of reversal, to acknowledge 
the importance of the safe harbor provision.48  Thus, the Supreme 
Court first forced the Florida jurists to acknowledge the significance 
of the December 12 deadline, and then insisted that its own hands 
were tied with regard to permitting the manual recount to continue, 
given the Florida court’s interpretation of the significance of the De-
cember 12 deadline. This is a nifty trick. Third and most importantly, 
nothing in the Florida Supreme Court opinion, and no sensible rea-
ding of state law, treated the December 12 safe harbor deadline as 
dispositive, regardless of any competing considerations.49  it is one 
44 Id. at 12.  The concurring opinion makes this same point, emphasizing the “wish” of  the state legislature to take ad-
vantage of  the federal safe harbor provision–a wish that appeared nowhere in the statute, but only in the state supreme 
court opinion.  Id. at 11-12 (concurring opinion). 
45 Bush, slip opinion at 2 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
46 See Gore v. Harris, slip opinion at 5 (per curiam). 
47 121 S.Ct. 471 (2000). 
48 Id. at 474 (noting that “a legislative wish to take advantage of  the ‘safe harbor’ would counsel against any construc-
tion of  the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law”).  Nothing in the Florida election code 
expresses such a “wish,” and even if  it did, it is hard to fathom which statutory interpretations this insight would “counsel 
against,” given that state courts engaging in statutory interpretation presumably always are trying correctly to identify the 
legislature’s intention. 
49 See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1867628 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring) (“[I]n my opinion, December 12 was not 
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thing to say that the Florida legislature would have wished, all things 
being equal, to take advantage of the federal safe harbor provision. 
it is another thing entirely to say that the legislature would have wan-
ted the availability of the safe harbor provision to trump any and all 
competing considerations, such as ensuring that every vote be coun-
ted.50 The outcome of the 2000 presidential election quite possibly 
turned on this aspect of the Bush decision–a rationale that is, to put 
it bluntly, a complete fabrication.
A separate concurring opinion joined by the Court’s three most 
conservative members (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas)–an opinion that commentators plausibly have suggested was 
originally designed as the majority opinion51–emphasizes a different 
rationale for reversing the Florida Supreme Court and terminating the 
manual recount.52  According to these Justices, Article ii of the Consti-
tution, which provides that state legislatures shall determine the manner 
of selecting presidential electors, forbids any state court interpretation 
of state election law that would represent a departure from the legis-
lative design.  Chief Justice Rehnquist identifies several ways in which 
(he says) the Florida Supreme Court’s decision ordering a state-wide 
manual recount impermissibly distorts state election law.53
The concurring opinion charts new territory, since this pro-
vision in Article ii has generated only one prior Supreme Court 
interpretation–and that decision was not directly relevant to Bush.54 
To say that the concurring opinion adopts a novel construction of 
Article ii is, again, not necessarily to suggest that there is anything 
wrong with that interpretation.  The relevant question is whether 
the interpretation (and its application) is persuasive, not whether 
it is novel. it is also relevant whether the interpretive principles em-
ployed in that construction are reconcilable with the general jurispru-
dential commitments of the Justices who endorsed it.  On neither of 
these scores does the concurring opinion pass muster.
a ‘drop-dead’ date under Florida law.”). 
50 See Bush, slip opinion at 5-6 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
51 See, e.g., David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, “‘Right to Vote’ Led Justices to 5-4 Ruling,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 
14, 2000, A1.  
52 Bush, slip opinion at 2. 
53 See infra text accompanying notes __. 
54 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
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The persuasiveness of the concurring opinion’s finding of an 
Article ii violation depends on the answer to two questions.  First, 
should the standard by which federal courts review state court inter-
pretations of state law be more aggressive than usual in the context of 
resolving presidential election contests?  Second, how unreasonable 
were the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretations of state election law 
in Bush?  The stronger the case for aggressive review and the more 
unreasonable the state court’s interpretations, the more persuasive is 
the concurring opinion’s determination that Article II was violated.
As to the standard of review, Chief Justice Rehnquist begins 
by conceding that, “[i]n most cases, comity and respect for federa-
lism compel us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of 
state law.”55  He goes on to observe, however, that because Article 
ii explicitly empowers the state legislature to select the manner of 
appointing electors and because the federal safe harbor provision ap-
plies only when the state election law was in place on the day of the 
election, “the text of the election law itself, and not just its interpreta-
tion by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance.”56 
Rehnquist does not go so far as to suggest that federal courts should 
engage in de novo interpretation of state election law in the context of 
a presidential election contest.  indeed, it would be hard to imagine 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas–Justices in the vanguard of the 1990s 
renaissance in constitutional federalism57–subscribing to the proposi-
tion that federal courts owe no deference whatsoever to state court 
interpretations of state law, regardless of the context.  instead, the 
concurring opinion argues for reduced deference.
This is an odd interpretation of Article ii.  These conservative 
Justices ordinarily profess a commitment to an originalist methodo-
logy of constitutional interpretation.58  Yet, they provide no evidence 
55 Bush, slip opinion at 2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  This principle is about as well-established as any can be.  See, e.g., 
Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).  See also Commissioner v. Estate of  Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) 
( “the state’s highest court is the best authority on its own law”).
56 Id. at 3. 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. __ (2000) (restrictive reading of  commerce clause power); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (state immunity from suit in state court); City of  Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997) (re-
strictive reading of  Section 5 power); Seminole Tribe of  Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (state immunity from suit in 
federal court under Eleventh Amendment); Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997) (tenth amendment prohibition 
on federal commandeering of  state executive officials). 
58 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that the Framers of Article ii intended to bolster the role of state le-
gislatures in the selection of presidential electors by forbidding state 
courts adjudicating contests arising from presidential elections from 
employing ordinary techniques of statutory interpretation to elicit 
the meaning of state election law.  Nor does the federal statute im-
plementing Article II (and the Twelfth Amendment), enacted after 
the 1876 election fiasco, indicate any congressional desire to have 
presidential election contests adjudicated under rules different from 
those employed in ordinary state election contests.59  Neither does 
the concurring opinion offer any functional justification for affording 
state legislatures federal judicial protection from their own state judi-
ciaries.  Even were Article ii sensibly interpreted to offer such protec-
tion, the Florida legislature has indicated no desire to take advantage 
of it. That legislature adopted a unitary election code, generally ap-
plying the same election contest rules to state and federal elections.60 
indeed, the Florida legislature has shown itself perfectly capable of 
indicating a preference, when it has one, to avoid judicial resolution 
of election contests; under Florida’s election code, disputes involving 
the election of state legislators are to be handled exclusively by the 
respective houses of the state legislature, not the courts.61  it is plau-
sible to draw the negative inference that the Florida legislature inten-
ded contests involving presidential elections to be adjudicated in the 
state courts according to the same rules that govern state election dis-
putes (excepting those involving state legislators).  In other settings, 
these same Justices have emphasized the importance of freeing states 
from federal command with regard to the structuring of their own 
governmental processes.62  Thus, it seems strange that the concurring 
opinion would not require a clearer statement from the constitutional 
text or the Framers’ original understanding before inferring a consti-
tutional command to federalize the allocation of state decisionmaking 
authority in the context of selecting presidential electors.
59 Electoral Count Act of  1887, 24 Stat. 373, 3 U.S.C. §5 (providing a safe harbor from congressional challenge where a 
“state shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to [election day], for its final determination of  any controversy or contest 
concerning the appointment of  . . . [electors] . . . by judicial or other methods”) (emphasis added). 
60 See Bush, slip opinion at 2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 See Fla. Stat. §102.168.
62 Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (requiring an “unmistakably clear” statement by Congress before 
construing a federal anti-discrimination law to apply to a state’s judiciary because it is “[t]hrough the structure of  its gov-
ernment . . . [that] a State defines itself  as a sovereign”). 
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Offering neither originalist nor functionalist support for their in-
terpretation, the concurring Justices rely entirely on the text of Article 
II–specifically, its reference to state “legislatures” directing the manner 
of choosing presidential electors. This spare textual reference simply 
does not bear the weight the concurrence ascribes to it.  Article i of the 
Constitution declares that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”63  Yet nobody has ever 
suggested that this language precludes judicial interpretation of congres-
sional statutes.  Indeed, since 1935 the Court never has held that this 
constitutional mandate that Congress exercise “[a]ll legislative power” 
precludes Congress from enacting vague (meaningless) statutes that es-
sentially delegate the lawmaking power to administrative agencies and 
to courts.64  indeed, some members of the conservative plurality are 
among the biggest proponents of the Chevron doctrine,65 which requires 
federal courts to defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations of statutes, 
notwithstanding the Article I injunction that Congress “legislat[e].”66  in 
Bush, Chief Justice Rehnquist does not explain why broad-ranging judi-
cial and administrative interpretation of federal statutes is permissible in 
spite of Article I’s requirement that “[a]ll legislative powers” be vested 
in “Congress,” but Article II’s injunction that state “[l]egislatures” direct 
the manner of appointing presidential electors forbids state courts from 
engaging in ordinary statutory interpretation of state election law.  Thus, 
not only does the plurality offer no originalist or functionalist justification 
for its Article ii argument, but its bare textualist claim is almost laugha-
ble.  it appears likely that nobody in the first two hundred years of the 
Republic ever dreamed of this interpretation of Article ii.
Chief Justice Rehnquist seeks to bolster the flimsy Article ii 
argument by observing that there are other “areas in which the Cons-
titution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still de-
63 U.S. Const., Art. I, §1.  
64 The last Supreme Court decisions invalidating federal legislation on nondelegation grounds were Panama Refining Co 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288 (1935) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  For a modern illustration 
of  how defunct the nondelegation doctrine is, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  In all fairness, at least 
the Chief  Justice is on record as favoring a reinvigoration of  this doctrine.  See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t v. American 
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
65 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law 994 n.52 (3d ed. 2000) (collecting Chevron cases). 
66 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring, with 
Rehnquist, C.J.); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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ferential, analysis of state law.”67  The Chief Justice plainly is correct 
about the existence of instances in which the Supreme Court has 
rejected state court interpretations of state law.  Federal rights often 
become entwined with questions of state law, and state judiciaries 
would be able to obstruct implementation of those rights if their 
own interpretations of state law were immune from federal review.68 
Consider a few examples.  State law determines whether a contract 
exists, which is a necessary predicate for a violation of Article i, sec-
tion 10, which forbids state impairment of the obligation of contract.69 
Similarly, state law determines whether a property right exists, which 
is a necessary predicate for the finding of an uncompensated taking, 
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.70 Whether re-
troactive criminal punishment has been imposed, in violation of the 
Ex Post Facto or Due Process Clauses, depends on whether state criminal 
law has changed since the defendant committed the alleged transgression, 
which turns partly on a determination of what state law was before the 
defendant acted.71  Finally, because the Supreme Court will not decide a 
federal question when “adequate and independent” state grounds exist 
to sustain a state court ruling, vindication of federal rights that are raised 
in state court proceedings depends on compliance with state procedural 
law.72 The adequacy of the state ground of decision depends partly on its 
not having been invented post hoc to defeat the posited federal right.73
67 Id. at 4-5 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Bouie v. City of  Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 
(1964), and Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813)). 
68 See, e.g., Peter W. Low & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Federal Courts and the Law of  Federal-State Relations 82 (4th ed. 1998) 
(“[i]f  there were no limits on the freedom of  state courts to determine whether a contract had been created and the nature 
of  its obligations, the federal limitation might be easily evaded”).
69 See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (“On such a question [of  whether there is a con-
tract], one primarily of  state law, we accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of  the State’s highest 
court but, in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves 
whether a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired 
its obligation.”).
70 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992) (noting that the Court will defer only 
to “an objectively reasonable application of  relevant precedents” defining the property right) (emphasis in original). 
71 See, e.g., Bouie v. City of  Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
72 See, e.g., Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
73 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  See generally Broad River Power Co. v. South Caro-
lina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (“[I]f  there is no evasion of  the constitutional issue, and the non-federal ground of  decision 
has fair support, this Court will not inquire whether the rule applied by the state court is right or wrong, or substitute its 
view of  what should be deemed the better rule, for that of  the state court.”) (citations omitted).  
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Thus, the concurring opinion is correct that the Supreme Court 
occasionally has rejected state court interpretations of state law in 
order to protect federal rights.  Yet the rule generated by these cases 
seems to be one requiring evidence of bad faith by the state courts 
in their interpretation of state law.  All three of the Supreme Court 
precedents cited by the concurring opinion on this score involved 
situations where state courts had manifested, beyond a shadow of a 
doubt, the willingness to defy federal law.74  A closer look at the two 
modern cases invoked by the concurring opinion reveals how little 
support they provide for federal court intervention in Bush v. Gore.75
in NAACP v. Alabama,76 the Supreme Court ruled that the NAA-
CP had a first amendment right to refuse to disclose its membership 
lists to Alabama authorities.  Before reaching the merits of the case, 
though, the Justices first had to decide whether the federal constitu-
tional claim was procedurally barred.  The Alabama Supreme Court 
had refused to consider the first amendment claim on its merits, be-
cause of the Association’s failure to follow the correct procedural 
path for securing state supreme court review of its contempt citation 
for refusing to disclose its membership lists.  Specifically, the state 
court ruled that the NAACP should have sought a writ of prohibition 
rather than a writ of mandamus.  It is inconceivable that the Justices’ 
view of the case–both on the merits and on the alleged state proce-
dural default–was uninfluenced by their knowledge that the state of 
Alabama, including its jurists, were engaged in a project of massive 
resistance toward Brown v. Board of Education,77 a fundamental part of 
which involved shutting down the NAACP’s operations in the state.78 
Yet even setting aside this extrinsic basis for questioning the good fai-
74 See Bush, slip opinion at 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the three cases invoked by the concurring opinion were 
“embedded in historical contexts”).
75 The third case, as Justice Ginsburg notes in dissent, involved the Revolutionary era conflict between southern state 
legislation confiscating Tory lands and federal treaties seeking to curtail confiscation.  That conflict led southern state 
courts to engage in efforts at nullification no more subtle than those undertaken by their counterparts in the civil rights 
era.  See Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (1813); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816); Bush, 
slip op. at 5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
76 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
77  See generally Numan Bartley, The Rise of   Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (1969).
78 See generally Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 Western Pol. Q. (1959).  On 
background to NAACP v. Alabama, see Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme 
Court, 1936-1961, at 284-89 (1994); Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of  the Civil Rights Movement, 
61 Tenn. L. Rev. 869, 887-900 (1994). 
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th of the state court justices in NAACP,79 the Supreme Court was able 
to identify no fewer than a half dozen prior Alabama Supreme Court 
decisions that had rejected precisely the procedural distinction relied 
upon by that court in NAACP to justify its refusal to reach the merits 
of the first amendment claim.80  incredibly, the state supreme court 
at an earlier stage of these same proceedings had directed the NAACP’s 
lawyers to seek appellate review via the very procedural route 
(a writ of mandamus) that the state justices later determined to cons-
titute a procedural default.81  in other civil rights era cases where the 
Supreme Court likewise declined to permit state procedural defaults 
to block federal review of constitutional claims, the Justices also were 
able to point to earlier state precedents that directly contravened the 
state court’s finding of a procedural default in the case under review.82 
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim that precedents like 
NAACP v. Alabama were “precisely parallel” to Bush,83 he failed to iden-
tify anything even remotely similar in Florida case law that would war-
rant the conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court was departing from 
established precedent.  Without expressly saying so, the conservative 
Justices implied that the Florida Supreme Court’s statutory interpreta-
tions in Bush were entitled to no greater deference in federal court than 
those of renegade white supremacist nullifiers during the civil rights 
era.84 One might have expected that these Justices would offer some 
factual predicate to justify this extraordinary (albeit implicit) aspersion 
on the integrity of state court jurists,85 but they did not. 
79 Most of  the other leading cases rejecting the adequacy of  state procedural grounds for denying federal rights also 
involve southern states obstructing the civil rights movement.  See, e.g., Barr v. City of  Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Shuttlesworth v. City of  Alabama, 376 U.S. 339 (1964); Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).  See also Low & Jeffries, supra note __, at 109 (“It is no coincidence that many such cases 
arose in the civil rights litigation in the 1960s.”); Glennon, supra note __, at 887-900. 
80 357 U.S. at 456 (concluding that “[w] e are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of  the Alabama Supreme Court 
in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings”).
81 Id. at 458. 
82 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297-300 (1964); Barr v. City of  Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 
(1964).  See also Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 105-07 (1938) (rejecting a state court’s determination of  
whether a contract existed because it conflicted with numerous earlier decisions of  that court). 
83 Bush, slip opinion at 4 (concurring opinion). 
84 See Bush, slip opinion at 7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that what must underlie the concurring Justices’ unwillingness 
to defer to the state court’s interpretation of  state law “is an unstated lack of  confidence in the impartiality and capacity 
of  the state judges who would make the critical decisions if  the vote count were to proceed”).
85 See id., slip opinion at 6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Florida Supreme Court ought not be “be bracketed 
with state high courts of  the Jim Crow South”).
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The other civil rights era decision invoked as precedent in Bush 
for upsetting a state court’s interpretation of state law was Bouie v. 
City of Columbia.86  That case is equally weak support for the Article 
ii rationale in Bush, but for a different reason.  in Bouie, the ques-
tion was whether it violated the Due Process Clause to convict sit-in 
demonstrators under a criminal trespass statute that barred “entry on 
lands of another after notice prohibiting same”87 when the protestors 
had been commanded to depart, but not warned against entering in 
the first place.  The Supreme Court ruled that for the state supreme 
court to interpret this statute to cover refusals to leave as well as 
forbidden entries “unforseeably and retroactively expanded” its me-
aning.88  in the process of so ruling, the Court had to reject the state 
court’s determination that the criminal trespass statute always had 
been construed this way.  The Justices were able to cite only dicta, 
not actual holdings, in support of their refutation of the state court’s 
interpretation of state law.  
The Bouie Court’s extraordinarily stringent interpretation of the 
notice requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause,89 and its 
unwillingness to defer to a state court’s ostensibly sensible cons-
truction of a state statute, can be understood only in the context of 
the times.  Between 1960 and 1964, the Supreme Court confron-
ted dozens of cases in which sit-in demonstrators were prosecuted 
for breach of the peace, trespass, and sundry other offenses.90  The 
Justices were disinclined to affirm the criminal convictions of per-
sons with whose racial protest they generally sympathized.  Yet, they 
also were unwilling to vindicate the protesters’ principal legal claim 
that the state action necessary for an equal protection violation was 
present when the state simply was enforcing background common 
law property rules.91  instead, the Justices identified a wide range of 
imaginative (specious) grounds for reversing the convictions without 
86 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
87 d. at 349 n.1 (reproducing statute). 
88 Id. at 352. 
89 See, e.g., Bouie, 378 U.S. at 363, 367 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that nobody could have been misled by this construc-
tion of  the statute). 
90 See, e.g., Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-in Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 Sup. Ct. Rev. 101; Monrad G. Paulsen, The Sit-in 
Cases of  1964: “But Answer Came There None,” 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 137. 
91 I have described some of  the internal deliberations in the sit-in cases, with citations to the original documents, in Mi-
chael Klarman, An Interpretive History of  Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 272-76 (1991). 
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reaching the fundamental constitutional question.92  By the time Bouie 
arrived on the Court’s docket, the 1964 Civil Rights Act–which would 
moot the state action issue by creating a federal statutory prohibition 
on race discrimination in places of public accommodation–was fi-
nally nearing passage, after the longest filibuster in the history of the 
United States Senate.93  in that setting, the Justices understandably 
were reluctant to affirm, for the very first time, the conviction of a sit-
-in demonstrator.  Thus the Court “invented” a due process objection 
to Bouie’s conviction, rejecting the state court’s view that the state 
criminal trespass statute always had forbidden refusals to depart after 
notice to leave, and holding that to interpret the provision this way 
now represented an unforeseeable expansion of the statute, in vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause.  Nobody who teaches criminal law 
would recognize this conception of what due process notice requi-
res.94  Leading criminal law casebooks treat Bouie as bad law–a case 
that can be accounted for only by the Justices’ political sympathies 
for the civil rights movement.95  Thus, the only legal principle that 
Bouie genuinely stands for is that sometimes the Supreme Court, for 
political reasons, will decide cases in a lawless fashion.  in one sense, 
then, though not the one the conservative Justices intended, Bouie 
was the perfect case for them to cite in Bush.
After laying the groundwork for reducing the deference owed 
to the state court’s interpretations of Florida law, the concurring opi-
nion proceeds to enumerate several ways in which that court’s inter-
pretations (were said to have) violated the legislature’s design.  The 
concurring Justices raised the following objections to the state supre-
me court decision in Bush96: it deprived the secretary of state’s certifi-
92 See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (reversing trespass conviction on ground that arrest by park em-
ployee who had been deputized as a sheriff  constituted state action); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (reversing 
disburbing-the-peace conviction on due process ground of  total absence of  evidence).
93 See Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of  National Policy, 1960-1972, at 151 (1990). 
94  See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of  Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 211 
(1985) (arguing that the “core concept of  notice as a requirement of  fairness to individuals” focuses on “whether the 
ordinary and ordinarily law-abiding individual would have received some signal that his or her conduct risked violation 
of  the penal law”). 
95 See, e.g., Peter Low, et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 100 (2d ed. 1986) (speculating that “the Court’s applica-
tion of  [fair notice] principles to the Bouie facts was somewhat more rigid than would have been the case if  a more ordi-
nary trespass was involved” and noting that “the Supreme Court itself  understands the context of  Bouie as qualifying its 
message, . . . [since] . . . Bouie has not become a substantial constraint on the interpretation of  ambiguities in subsequently 
construed federal criminal statutes”). 
96 Bush, slip opinion at 7-12.
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cation of the election results of “virtually all legal consequence,”97 it 
engaged in de novo review of the local canvassing boards’ decisions 
whether to conduct manual recounts after the certification deadline; 
by ordering the inclusion in the certification of all recounts com-
pleted during the contest phase, it eliminated the statutory grant of 
discretion to the Secretary of State with regard to waiving the cer-
tification deadline; it unreasonably construed the contest provision 
requiring that “legal votes” not be rejected to require the counting 
of “improperly marked ballots”; it refused to defer to the Secretary 
of State’s reasonable interpretations of state election law, as required 
by statute; and it unreasonably construed the statutory grant to state 
courts of the power to issue “appropriate relief” in contest actions 
to include a state-wide manual recount that could not possibly be 
completed in time to realize the state legislature’s “wish” to take ad-
vantage of the federal safe harbor provision. 
it is fair to say that the protest and contest provisions of Flori-
da election law are characterized by significant ambiguity, which for 
the most part never has been clarified by the Florida courts–unsur-
prisingly, since the contest provisions were substantially overhauled 
in 1999.98  On many of the statutory interpretation issues raised in 
Bush, reasonable people surely might differ.99  Yet none of the Flori-
da court’s interpretations are particularly “peculiar,”100 and certainly 
none of them qualifies as “absurd,”101 which is how the concurring 
opinion characterizes them.  Florida election law clearly contempla-
tes a contest to certified election results.  The substantive standard 
that must be established for the contest to proceed is, in relevant 
part, the “rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change 
or place in doubt the result of the election.”102  Given the closeness 
of the certified presidential election result in Florida–a margin of 537 
votes for Bush–there is no doubt that the number of undervotes (esti-
97 Id. at 8
98 On the contrast between the new and the old contest provisions, see Gore v. Harris, slip opinion at 9 n.9
99 The dissenting opinions of  Justices Souter and Breyer ably demonstrate how the Florida court’s interpretation of  all 
the relevant statutory ambiguities were at least reasonable.  See Bush, slip opinion at 2-6 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 6-8 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).   Several of  the points made in this and the following paragraphs are also made in those dissenting 
opinions. 
100 Id. at 9 (concurring opinion). 
101 Id.
102 Fla. Stat. §102.168(3)(c) (2000). 
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mated at 60,000) was sufficient to “place in doubt” the election result. 
The only question was whether undervotes qualify as “legal votes.” 
This was a question of first impression for the Florida Supreme Court. 
The state jurists determined that ballots that clearly express the in-
tent of a voter, but that were marked in such a way that the voting 
machines could not read them, qualify as “legal.”103  The concurring 
opinion calls this conclusion “absurd,” yet it is consistent with the 
way Florida courts historically have defined legal votes,104 with ex-
plicit language in the Florida election code requiring that the “intent 
of the voter” be ascertained with regard to damaged and defective 
ballots,105 and with the interpretation of numerous other state supre-
me courts.106 Nor is it clear that the Florida Supreme Court owed any 
articular deference to the Secretary of State’s contrary interpretation, 
given the political nature of her position, the absence of any obvious 
agency “expertise” that would entitle her interpretation to deference, 
the fact that her interpretation was post hoc rather than a product of 
ex ante rulemaking, and the generally uncertain standard of judicial 
deference to agency legal interpretations called for by Florida admi-
nistrative law.107
103 See Gore v. Harris, slip opinion at 23-25. 
104 See, e.g., Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 267 (Fla. 1975) (denying, in the context of  a challenge to absentee bal-
lots, that there is any “magic in the statutory requirements,” and insisting that the “important” question is whether “the 
will of  the people was effected”); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 50-51 (Fla. 1940) (concluding that a ballot 
shall be counted “if  the will and intention of  the voter can be determined,” even if  the voter did not follow the instruc-
tions for marking the ballot”); Wiggins v. State ex rel. Drane, 144 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. 1932) (holding that ballots that “clearly 
indicate the choice of  the voter” must be counted, even if  “irregular”); Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411, 412 
(Fla. 1917) (per curiam) (“Where a ballot is so marked as to plainly indicate the voter’s choice and intent in placing his 
marks thereon, it should be counted as marked unless some positive provision of  law would be thereby violated”).  But 
see McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944). 
105 Fla. Stat. §101.5614 (5) (providing that no ballot shall be disregarded “if  there is a clear indication of  the intent of  the 
voter as determined by a canvassing board”); see also id. §102.166 (7). 
106 See, e.g., In re Election of  U.S. Representative for Second Congressional Dist., 653 A. 2d 79, 90-91 (Ct. 1994) (reject-
ing the view that legal votes are only those complying strictly with the ballot instructions and instead counting all ballots 
upon which “the intent of  the voter” is apparent “in light of  all the available evidence disclosed by the ballot”); Duffy v. 
Mortensen, 497 N.W. 2d 437, 439 (S.D. 1993) (holding that a punch card ballot with two corners of  the chad detached 
must be counted, since the voter’s intent could be discerned, and “the policy of  the state is to count each person’s vote 
in an effort to determine the true and actual intent of  the voters”); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E. 2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990) 
(holding that “voters should not be disfranchised where their intent may be ascertained with reasonable certainty, simply 
because the chad they punched did not completely dislodge from the ballot”); Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217, 221 (Alaska 
1987) (holding that punch card ballots marked entirely in pen and pencil are legal votes, “because they provided clear evi-
dence of  the voters’ intent”); Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E. 2d 1212, 1225 (Ind. 1981) (affirming trial court’s judgment that 
ballots with “hanging chads” could be counted, since “the intention of  the voter could be clearly discerned”); McCavitt v. 
Registrar of  Voters of  Brockton, 434 N.E. 2d 620, 624-25 (Mass. 1982) (holding that the court must ascertain the intent 
of  the voters with regard to punch card ballots that have not bee punched through sufficiently for the machine to count 
them); Escalante v. City of  Hermosa Beach, 241 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201-03 (Cal. App. 1987). 
107 For a concise summary of  the conflicting approaches that Florida courts have taken on the question of  how much 
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The contest provisions of the Florida election code do not dis-
close what level of deference is owed to the Secretary of State’s 
certification of the election results or to local canvassing boards’ deci-
sions not to conduct manual recounts.  Since the very purpose of an 
election contest is to challenge the certification, it makes no sense to 
have a contest provision while deferring entirely to the certification. 
The statutory standard for a contest to proceed–“rejection of a num-
ber of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the results of 
the election”–does not indicate that any deference at all is owed to 
the decisions of administrative officials.  Perhaps de novo review is 
not the most sensible way of structuring an election contest scheme, 
but it is perfectly consistent with the statutory language, which the 
concurring opinion emphasizes is entitled to special weight in light 
of Article ii concerns.108  Nor does it contravene any Florida Supreme 
Court precedent, since that court never before had interpreted the 
amended contest provisions.  A Florida appellate court, construing 
the old contest provision, had ruled that the same deference explici-
tly granted by statute to local canvassing boards with regard to con-
ducting manual recounts during the protest phase should apply du-
ring the contest phase,109 but that ruling is not precedent for the state 
supreme court.  Moreover, to overrule in the contest phase of the 
proceedings a local canvassing board’s discretionary judgment during 
the protest phase not to conduct a manual recount does not nullify 
the statutory grant of discretion; rather, it restricts its force to elections 
deference courts owe to agency legal interpretations, see David M. Greenbaum & Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., 1999 Amend-
ments to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act: Phantom Menace or Much Ado About Nothing?, 27 Fla. St. L.  Rev. 499, 
522-24 (2000).  Compare also Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844 (Fla. 1993) (“although 
not binding judicial precedent, advisory opinions of  affected agency heads are persuasive authority and, if  the construc-
tion of  law in those opinions is reasonable, they are entitled to great weight in construing the law as applied to that af-
fected agency of  government”); State Dep’t of  Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So. 2d 238, 242 
(Fla. App. 1981) (according a “most weighty presumption of  validity” to agency rulemaking) with Tampa Electric Co. v. 
Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000); Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v. Board of  County Comissioners, 642 
So. 2d 1081, 1083-84 (Fla. 1994) (refusing to defer to an “unreasonable” interpretation); see also Darby v. State ex rel. 
McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917) (showing no deference to local election officials’ interpretation of  what counts as a 
legal vote).  For the rule that only interpretations implicating an agency’s expertise warrant deference, see, e.g., Zopf  v. 
Singletary, 686 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. App. 1996); Board of  Trustees v. Department of  Management Servs., 651 So. 2d 170, 
173 (Fla. App. 1995).  For the rulemaking requirement, see Fla. Stat. §120.54.  For the willingness of  Florida courts to 
show greater deference to agency legal interpretations that flow from rulemaking, as opposed to post hoc adjudication, 
see, e.g., Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 384 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1980); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of  Business Regulation, 393 So. 1177, 1182 (Fla. App. 1981).  I am grateful to Jim Rossi for directing me to relevant 
sources and for helping to clarify Florida administrative law for me.
108 It is ironic, given the concurring opinion’s emphasis on the text of  the Florida election code, that it was the Bush camp 
arguing against a literal, and in favor of  a holistic, reading of  the statute.  
109 Broward County Canvassing Board v. Hogan, 607 So.2d 508 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
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that are not so close at the state level as to raise a doubt whether 
uncounted lawful votes might change the election outcome.110 Thus, 
the Florida Supreme Court’s decision to engage in de novo review of 
Vice-President Gore’s request for manual recounts is consistent with 
the statutory contest language, not inconsistent with any binding Flo-
rida precedent, and reconcilable with a statutory grant of discretion 
to local canvassing boards not to conduct manual recounts at the pro-
test phase of election proceedings.  in what alternate universe does 
such an interpretation of Florida election law qualify as “absurd”? 
Having found the statutory contest standard satisfied, the Flo-
rida Supreme Court ordered a state-wide manual recount, notwiths-
tanding the shortness of time.  The court relied on the statutory pro-
vision authorizing courts to order “any relief appropriate,”111 once the 
threshold requirement for an election contest had been satisfied.  The 
concurring opinion states that this reading of “appropriate relief” can-
not be reconciled with the legislature’s “wish” to take advantage of 
the federal safe harbor provision.  Yet, as we have seen, the legisla-
ture expressed no such wish, and even if it had, reading Florida elec-
tion law to elevate that wish over all competing considerations would 
be nonsensical.112  The Florida Supreme Court ordered the statewide 
manual recount on December 8.  in all likelihood, that recount would 
have been completed by December 12, had the Supreme Court not 
stayed it the morning it began (December 9).  The recount almost 
certainly would have been completed by December 18–the date by 
which Florida electors had to be appointed in order to participate 
in the electoral college balloting.  There is nothing odd about cons-
truing “any relief appropriate” to include a statewide manual recount 
that probably could have been completed in time to avoid jeopardi-
zing Florida’s participation in the electoral college vote.113
Finally, the Gore team not only had the plain meaning of the 
110 See Gore v. Harris, slip opinion at 61 (Harding, J., dissenting) (noting that the “abuse of  discretion” standard applicable 
at the protest phase does not apply during the contest phase); Bush, slip opinion at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
111 Fla. Stat. §102.168(8).
112 See supra __. 
113 he concurring opinion notes that even if  the manual recount could have been completed by December 12, “the 
inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals to the Supreme Court of  Florida and petitions for certiorari to this Court 
could not possibly be completed by that date.”  Bush, slip opinion at 11 (concurring opinion).  It is not obvious this is 
true, especially since the relevant date is December 18, not December 12. But even if  it were true, it is not obvious why a 
completed manual recount with uncompleted judicial challenges ought not to be preferred to a machine count that clearly 
missed thousands of  ballots on which the voters’ intention could be discerned. 
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statute on its side, but also the plain tenor of Florida election law 
precedent.  While the specific statutory intepretation questions raised 
by the election contest were not resolved by prior precedent, the 
one clear principle to be derived from Florida election cases is that 
safeguarding the right to vote and ascertaining the will of the voter 
trump more technical questions of compliance with legal formality. 
Numerous Florida court decisions have embraced this proposition.114 
in light of this background interpretive principle, plainly established 
by Florida precedent, the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that presi-
dential undervotes must be examined to ascertain, wherever possi-
ble, the actual intent of the voters was entirely unexceptionable.  The 
barrage of criticism leveled by Republican politicos against manual 
recounts–which was slyly endorsed by the concurring opinion115–was 
in fact a lawless refusal to abide by either explicit statutory language 
authorizing such recounts116 or by abundant Florida precedent endor-
sing the principle that ascertaining the actual intent of voters was the 
paramount objective of courts adjudicating election controversies.117 
Reasonable people certainly can disagree where to draw the 
line between a merely mistaken interpretation and a manifestly unre-
asonable one.  Moreover, degrees of unreasonableness are notoriou-
sly difficult to quantify or otherwise measure objectively.  Perhaps, in 
light of these considerations, it was inevitable that Republican Justi-
ces, like so many Republican politicians and voters, would conclude 
that the Florida Supreme Court was “stealing” the election from Geor-
ge W. Bush,118 and thus that its statutory interpretations were entitled 
114 See, e.g., Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 845 (Fla. 1993) (“election laws should gener-
ally be liberally construed in favor of  an elector”); State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536  So. 2d 1007, 1009 (Fla. 1988) 
(noting that ‘the object of  holding an election” is “the electorate’s effecting its will through its balloting, not the hyper-
technical compliance with statutes”); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263, 269 (Fla. 1975) (noting that “the right of  a 
citizen to vote” is more important than “unyielding adherence to statutory scripture” and “that the primary consideration 
in an election contest is whether the will of  the people has been effected”); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 
(Fla. 1940) (“It is the intention of  the law to obtain an honest expression of  the will or desire of  the voter.”).  
115 Bush, slip opinion at 11 (concurring opinion) (noting that the manual recount of  undervotes was “a search for elu-
sive–perhaps delusive–certainty”). 
116 Fla. Stat. §102.166 (4)(c); §101.166(5). 
117 See supra note __. 
118 See, e.g., David Tell, “The Bush Victory,” Weekly Standard, Dec. 25, 2000, p. 9 (criticizing the Florida Supreme Court 
decision as “ridiculous” and “ghastly”); Nelson Lund, “An Act of  Courage,” Weekly Standard, Dec. 25, 2000, at 19 (accus-
ing the Florida Supreme Court of  “violat[ing] the Constitution” and blaming it for forcing the Supreme Court to inter-
vene); Robert F. Nagel, “From U.S. v. Nixon to Bush v. Gore,” Weekly Standard, Dec. 25, 2000, at 20 (calling the Florida 
Supreme Court decision “stunning” and a product of  “intellectual anarchy”); Michael S. Greve, “The Real Division in the 
Court,” Weekly Standard, Dec. 25, 2000, at 28 (noting some doubt whether “repeated judicial attempts to stack the deck in 
a presidential election do not compare to the moral scandal of  Jim Crow”); Kristol & Bell, supra note __ (arguing that the 
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to no more deference than those of the Jim Crow state courts that 
had manifested a willingness to lie and cheat in order to nullify Bro-
wn and obstruct the civil rights movement.  it is impossible to dis-
prove conclusively these Republican accusations, especially since 
the genuine indeterminacy of Florida election law probably made 
it inevitable that the partisan preferences of the Florida court’s De-
mocratic justices would influence their statutory interpretations (in 
favor of Al Gore).119  Yet, permitting partisan considerations to in-
fluence the resolution of genuine legal ambiguity is not equivalent 
to “stealing” an election.  It is almost impossible to imagine Rehn-
quist, Scalia and Thomas concluding that these particular state court 
interpretations of state law were “absurd” in any context other than 
the one in which George W. Bush’s election to the presidency hung 
in the balance.120  indeed, in other settings, these three Justices have 
insisted that federal courts should defer even to state court interpre-
tations of federal law unless “patently unreasonable.”121  it takes little 
imagination to picture the impassioned (indeed, characteristically 
vitriolic) assault on judicial activism and federal overreaching that 
Justice Scalia might have penned had the candidates been reversed 
and it was Al Gore asking the United States Supreme Court to re-
solve a presidential election contest by repudiating a state court’s 
interpretation of state law.122
“injustice being done by the Florida Supreme Court” is helping Gore to “steal” the election); Krauthammer, supra note 
__ (blaming a “rogue state supreme court,” which in “an astonishing burst of  willfulness,” created a “constitutional crisis” 
because of  its “mission” to defeat George W. Bush); Matthew Vita & Juliet Eilperin, “Congress Braces for Battle over 
Electoral Votes,” Washington Post, Nov. 22, 2000, A19 (quoting House Majority Whip Tom DeLay accusing the Democratic 
Party of  “prosecuting a war to reverse the results of  a fair, free election by any means necessary” and calling the Florida 
Supreme Court decision “a blatant and extraordinary abuse of  judicial power”); Eiric Pianin & Helen Dewar, “Congress 
Sits on Political Powder Keg,” Washington Post, Dec. 10, 2000, A31 (noting that DeLay and other congressional Republicans 
have accused Democrats and Florida’s Supreme Court of  an effort to “steal” the election from Bush).  Indeed, the con-
servative Justices defended their involvement by implicitly blaming Gore for turning to the courts in the first place.  Bush, 
121 S. Ct. at 533 (“None are more conscious of  the vital limits on judicial authority than are the members of  this Court. . 
. . When contending parties invoke the process of  the Court, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve 
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”). 
119 On the other hand, in defense of  the state supreme court, Florida precedents really do emphasize the importance of  
effectuating the will of  the voters in election controversies.  See supra __. 
120 Bush, slip opinion at 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Were the other members of  this Court as mindful as they generally 
are of  our system of  dual sovereignty, they would affirm the judgment of  the Florida Supreme Court.”) 
121 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (Thomas, J., plurality op.) (habeas proceeding); id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).  See also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (under Teague, federal courts on habeas review 
must defer to state courts’ “reasonable, good-faith interpretations” of  federal court precedent).  See also Sandra D. 
O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of  a State Court Judge, 
22 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 801, 813 (1981) (“There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not provide 
a ‘hospitable forum’ in litigating federal constitutional questions.”).
122 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (analogizing Casey to Dred Scott, 
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II. LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES
I already have expressed doubt whether the Supreme Court’s 
institutional stature and legitimacy depend much, in the long term, 
on the quality of the legal reasoning of its opinions.123  Rather, the 
judgment of history seems to depend more on whether the Court 
generally reaches the “right” results–meaning simply that its decisions 
prove consonant with long-term popular opinion.  Of course, measu-
ring the Court’s relative institutional stature at any particular point in 
time is difficult.  identifying with any degree of precision the factors 
that contribute to or detract from that stature is virtually impossible. 
Necessarily, then, much of what follows is impressionistic. 
A quick canvass of American constitutional history identifies 
several factors that may influence the way in which particular Su-
preme Court decisions influence the public’s estimation of the Court. 
First, i shall try to identify the relevant variables.  Then, i will illus-
trate their application with concrete examples from American cons-
titutional history.  Finally, i shall consider how these variables apply 
in the context of Bush v. Gore.  My goal is to shed light on how that 
ruling is likely to impact the Court’s long-term standing.
My basic premise, to repeat, is that the Court’s institutional 
standing ultimately depends on producing decisions that garner the 
long-term approval of the American public.  Thus, the principal va-
riable influencing the Court’s reputation is how popular or unpopular 
its decisions are. Second, in addition to the amount of support and 
opposition to particular decisions, the intensity of that sentiment–
how strongly supporters and opponents feel about the underlying is-
sue–influences the Court’s standing.  Third and relatedly, intensity of 
opposition is a function not only of how strongly people feel about 
an issue, but also how convinced they are that the Court decision 
resolving that issue will be implemented, rather than evaded or even 
nullified.  Court rulings that are adverse to a constituency’s treasured 
interests, but that are unlikely to prove efficacious, probably will 
not generate tremendous resistance.  Fourth, how powerful are the 
constituencies that support and oppose the Court’s rulings? Decisions 
lambasting the notion that the Court can settle great national controversies through constitutional adjudication, and laud-
ing the idea of  local rather than national solutions). 
123 See supra __. 
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that alienate relatively powerful interest groups are more likely to 
affect adversely the Court’s stature.  Fifth, some constitutional issues 
linger, while others fade away.  Controversial decisions on topics 
that quickly become obsolete are unlikely to do the Court much 
long-term harm.  Sixth, public opinion changes–often quite dramati-
cally–on some constitutional issues but not others.  Court decisions 
that initially prove controversial later may be regarded as great moral 
victories.  Conversely, some rulings initially are approved, yet subse-
quently are deemed moral disasters.  Seventh, on some occasions but 
not others, the Justices enjoy subsequent opportunities to adjust their 
original decision, thus modulating results that initially proved contro-
versial.  Eighth, contentious constitutional decisions sometimes come 
in packages.  A ruling that might not have significantly impaired the 
Court’s standing had it been an isolated event, may weaken an ins-
titution already under siege owing to contemporaneous decisions.
it may be helpful to flesh out these variables with some con-
crete illustrations from American constitutional history.  it stands to 
reason that unpopular decisions will threaten the Court’s long-term 
standing, especially given the tenuous legitimacy of ostensibly coun-
termajoritarian judicial review in a democratic system.124  Historically, 
the Justices, apparently comprehending this risk, generally have used 
the Constitution to suppress outlier state practices. Such decisions 
are, almost by definition, likely to generate support among national 
majorities.  Some people are surprised to discover how many of the 
Court’s notable constitutional rulings fit this suppression-of-outliers 
description.  By no means an exhaustive list includes Troxel v. Gran-
ville125 (parental rights); Romer v. Evans126 (gay rights); United States v. 
Virginia127 (sex discrimination in public universities); Plyler v. Doe128 (ri-
ght of children of illegal aliens to free public education); Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland129 (familial relationships); Coker v. Georgia130 (propor-
tionality review in connection with the death penalty); Harper v. Vir-
124 See, e.g., Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (1962).
125 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
126 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
127 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
128 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
129 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
130 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
37  R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro,  v. 20, n. 2, p. 8 - 53, Maio/Agosto 2018 
ginia Board of Elections131  (poll tax); Griswold v. Connecticut132 (right to 
use contraceptives); Brown v. Mississippi133 (coerced confessions); and 
Nixon v. Herndon134 (white primary). On all these occasions, judicial 
invalidation of state legislation was relatively uncontroversial because 
national majorities agreed with the results of the Court’s constitutional 
interpretations. Small wonder that an institution that is able generally 
to mirror national opinion, while simultaneously perpetuating the no-
ble myth that it heroically defends minority rights from majoritarian 
oppression, remains so popular with the American public.135
Of course, some of the Court’s most famous constitutional ru-
lings do not fit this paradigm.  On these other, more exceptional 
occasions, roughly half the country agrees with the Court’s decision, 
while the other half disagrees.  i believe this is a generally accurate 
description of Prigg v. Pennsylvania136 (fugitive slave renditions); Dred 
Scott v. Sandford137 (slavery in the territories); Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation138 (school desegregation); Furman v. Georgia139 (death penalty); 
Roe v. Wade140 (abortion); and Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke141 (affirmative action).  While such decisions are certain to 
prove more controversial than the suppression-of-outliers variety, at 
least the Justices can count on the support of roughly fifty percent 
of the nation.
On only a relative handful of occasions has the Court inter-
preted the Constitution in ways opposed by a clear majority of the 
nation.  This rather small category includes decisions invalidating 
131 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
132 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
133 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
134 273 U.S. 536 (1927).  I provide support for the claim that these decisions involved suppression of  outlier state prac-
tices in Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of  American Freedom, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 265, 279 nns.60-65 
(2000) (book review). 
135 Statements subscribing to this myth are collected in Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liber-
ties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 1-3 & nns. 1-14 (1996).  For speculation on why the myth continues to hold sway, see 
id. at 18-31. 
136 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
137 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
138 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
139 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
140 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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school prayer142 and criminal bans on flag burning,143 as well as sa-
feguarding the rights of criminal defendants, such as Miranda v. Ari-
zona.144  Even on these exceptional occasions, though, it would be 
mistaken to suppose that overwhelming popular majorities oppose the 
Court.  The Justices invalidated school prayer and Bible reading only 
after the relative demise of the nation’s unofficial Protestant establish-
ment.145  Likewise, the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution 
was rendered possible only by shifting public attitudes toward race, 
poverty, and totalitarian law enforcement practices.146  Thus, while 
national majorities have opposed the Court decisions in this category, 
a solid thirty-to-forty percent of the American public has sided with 
the Justices.147
The number of times that an overwhelming majority of Ameri-
cans has opposed the Court’s constitutional interpretations probably 
can be counted on one hand.  Chisholm v. Georgia,148 ruling noncon-
senting states suable in federal court under Article iii, clearly is such 
an instance.  Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,149 invalidating New 
York’s minimum wage law in the midst of the Great Depression, may 
well be another.  Significantly, both of these decisions did harm the 
Court’s standing.  Chisholm was the Supreme Court’s first significant 
constitutional decision, and the Justices got it so wrong (in the sen-
se of contravening public opinion) that Congress immediately sla-
pped them down, passing the Eleventh Amendment by majorities of 
nine-to-one in the House and eleven-to-one in the Senate.150   Chief 
Justice Jay concluded, as a result of this episode, that the Supreme 
Court never would achieve equal standing with the other branches 
of the national government; he resigned soon afterwards to become 
governor of New York.  Similarly, Tipaldo was the straw that broke 
142 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
143 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
144 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
145 See Klarman, Civil Rights, at 46-62. 
146 See id. at 62-66. 
147 For the polls on flag burning and school prayer, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. rev. 
577, 606 & n.142, 607 & n.148 (1993).  
148 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
149 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
150  See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief  Justiceships of  John Jay and Oliver Ells-
worth 200 (1995); 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 101 (1926). On hostile public reaction 
to Chisholm, see id. at 96-101.
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the camel’s back during the New Deal constitutional crisis.151  While 
President Roosevelt and other Democrats had criticized earlier rulin-
gs striking down New Deal measures such as the National industrial 
Recovery Act152 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act,153 those statu-
tes were sufficiently unpopular that the Court decisions invalidating 
them commanded something close to majority support in the na-
tion.154  By 1936, however, both Democrats and Republicans endor-
sed state minimum wage legislation, and thus Tipaldo incited a fires-
torm of criticism.  That ruling was the proximate cause of Roosevelt’s 
Court-packing plan–a scheme that certainly would have damaged 
the Court’s stature had it been enacted.  Thus, constitutional rulings 
that contravene overwhelming public opinion–at least on salient is-
sues–do jeopardize the Court’s standing.  No doubt cognizant of this 
reality, the Justices rarely have tempted fate by frustrating the wishes 
of dominant majorities.
Whether other rulings harm the Court’s reputation is partly a 
product of the intensity of preference manifested by opponents of 
the Court’s decisions.  Thus, for example, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion generated furious resistance among southern whites–opposition 
that succeeded at blocking implementation of the Court’s edict for 
an entire decade.155   The Court’s standing among southern whites 
was severely impaired as a result of Brown and other Warren Court 
rulings.156 (The Court’s standing recovered as national–including sou-
thern–opinion changed dramatically on the race issue as a result of 
the 1960s’ civil rights movement.157) Similarly, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
151 See William Leuchtenburg, The Origins of  FDR’s Court-Packing Plan, 1966 S. Ct. Rev. 347, 376-77
152 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
153 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
154 See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of  a Constitutional Revolution 34-35 (1998); 
Leuchtenburg, supra note __, at 368. 
155 See generally Numan Bartley, The Rise of  Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s (1969); 
Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 (1971); Benjamin 
Muse, Ten Years of  Prelude: The Story of  Integration Since the Supreme Court’s 1954 Decision (1964). 
156 See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Congress Versus the Supreme Court 1957-1960, at 18 (1961) (noting attacks on the 
Court by southerners that “were vituperative in the extreme, calling into question not only the ability but also the motives 
and the patriotism of  the justices”); Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Court: A Case Study in the American Political 
Process 264-65 (1962) (noting polls revealing a rise in the Supreme Court’s unfavorable ratings among white southerners 
after Brown).  Brady, supra note __, conveys a vivid sense of  how whites in the deep South felt about the Supreme Court 
as a result of  Brown. 
157 See, e.g., Matthew David Lassiter, The Rise of  the Suburban South: The “Silent Majority” and the Politics of  Edu-
cation, 1945-75 (Ph.D., University of  Virginia 1999),  Part IV: The Suburbanization of  Southern Politics:  The Silent 
Majority and the Fate of  the Sunbelt, 34 (noting a Gallup Poll released in May 1970 which revealed that only 16 percent 
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which undercut the very legitimacy of the Republican Party, pre-
dictably produced ferocious opposition among the party faithful.158 
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, as many more Americans 
rallied to the Republican banner and concluded that Dred Scott had 
been an egregious mistake, the Court’s standing probably did suffer, 
at least for a short period of time.159  Conversely, while a majority 
of Americans opposed the Court’s flag burning decisions of 1989-
1990,160 that opposition does not appear to have been intensely com-
mitted, judging by the relative rapidity with which the flag-burning 
issue has died away.161  Similarly, one reason that the Court’s school 
prayer decisions have not significantly impaired its stature, notwi-
thstanding opposition from sixty-to-seventy percent of the American 
public, may be that critics are not intensely committed to the sort of 
watered-down, nondenominational prayer that was at issue in Engel 
v. Vitale and that likely would be reinstated were that decision ever 
to be overturned.162
intensity of opposition is partly a product of how efficacious 
the Court’s rulings are deemed likely to be.  When the Supreme 
Court invalidated residential segregation ordinances in Buchanan v. 
Warley163 in 1917, the white South received the news calmly, secure in 
the knowledge that residential segregation could be maintained wi-
thout formal legal sanction.164  Similarly, when the Court in Norris v. 
of  southern whites opposed sending their children to school with any blacks, as compared with 61 percent in 1963).  
158 See, e.g., Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and History 423-27 (1978); 2 
Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 302-09 (1926?); Stanley I. Kutler, ed., The Dred Scott Deci-
sion: Law or Politics? 46-50, 56-63 (1967) (reproducing Republican editorial and political criticism).  
159 See, e.g., Walker Lewis, Without Fear or Favor: A Biography of  Chief  Justice Roger Brooke Taney 423 (1965) (Dred 
Scott “impaired the prestige of  the Court for years to come”); id. at 470-71 (noting ferocious Republican attacks on Chief  
Justice Taney after his death in 1864); Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of  the United States, its Foundation, 
Methods and Achievements: An Interpretation 51 (1928) (“It was many years before the Court, even under new judges, 
was able to retrieve its reputation”); Edwin Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision, in Light of  Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 
17 Am. Hist. Rev. 52, 68-69 (1911) (concluding that the process of  “recuperating its shattered reputation” was “so slow 
and laborious” that the Court did not “play anything like its due role of  supervision” during the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion).  But see Fehrenbacher, supra note __, at 579 (“[T]he notion that the Supreme Court, owing to its association with 
the Dred Scott decision, was in mortal danger during the Civil War, is largely fiction”); Stanley I. Kutler, Judicial Power 
and Reconstruction Politics 7-11 (1968) (distinguishing between criticism of  Dred Scott and criticism of  the Court as an 
institution, and denying that Dred Scott significantly impaired the Court’s national standing). 
160 See supra note __.  
161 See Robert Justin Goldstein, Flag Burning and Free Speech: The Case of  Texas v. Johnson 226 (2000).
162 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. 
163 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
164 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 6, 1917, pp. 4-5; Wesley G. Marshall, “The Dawn is Breaking: Buchanan v. Warley and the 
Fight Against Residential Segregation” 99 (M.A. thesis, University of  Virginia 1985). 
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Alabama165 in 1935 overturned the second round of convictions of the 
Scottsboro Boys on the ground that blacks had been systematically 
excluded from the juries that indicted and convicted them, southern 
white reaction was muted, not because opposition to black jury servi-
ce had significantly eroded, but rather because of confidence that the 
ruling easily could be circumvented.166  One reason that the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure revolution has not significantly impaired 
the Court’s standing may be that legislatures have successfully blun-
ted its impact by refusing adequately to fund counsel for indigent 
defendants, thus disabling them from taking full advantage of the 
panoply of constitutional rights identified by the Court.167  Converse-
ly, one reason Brown aroused a firestorm of resistance among white 
southerners is that, by 1954, they doubted their ability to control the 
decision’s impact, given the increased assertiveness of southern bla-
cks inspired by World War ii, the diminished availability of violence 
as a method of ensuring racial subordination, and the heightened 
attentiveness of the federal executive to civil rights issues.168  Simi-
larly, opposition to Roe v. Wade has been intense partly because the 
decision has proven difficult to nullify, given the market incentives it 
created for abortion suppliers.169
Another factor influencing whether controversial constitutional 
decisions adversely affect the Court’s standing is the relative power 
wielded by supporters and critics.  Not all constituencies affected by 
Court decisions exercise the same clout.  For example, Court rulings 
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries invalidating 
the progressive income tax, and striking down minimum wage, ma-
ximum hour, and protective union legislation, were intensely con-
troversial.170  Yet opponents of these decisions, on average, lacked 
the economic and political resources of supporters.  Similarly, more 
165 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
166 See sources cited in Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of  Modern Criminal Procedure, 90 Mich. L. Rev. ??, ?? 
(2000). 
167 See William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997). 
168 See generally Michael J. Klarman, Neither Hero, Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the 
Twentieth Century, ch. 4: The World War II Era (forthcoming, Oxford University Press). 
169 See Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, at 195-201.
170 The leading cases included Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage law); Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (pro-union legislation); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (maximum hour law); Pollock 
v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (income tax).  For the controversy generated by such decisions, see 
generally William Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890-1937 (1994). 
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recent controversial decisions such as Roe v. Wade and Engel v. Vitale 
generally have won the endorsement of the nation’s cultural elite, 
which tends to be both better educated and more socioeconomically 
advantaged than the average American.171 Thus, while nearly half the 
country has criticized the abortion decision and more than half has 
opposed the school prayer ruling, the Court’s defenders exercise re-
latively greater economic, political, and cultural clout, thus reducing 
the likelihood that these rulings will diminish the Court’s stature. 
Even more dramatically, opponents of Plessy v. Ferguson,172 the Court’s 
first decision rejecting an equality-based challenge to racial segre-
gation, exercised almost no power at all.  Whites overwhelmingly 
endorsed Plessy, and African Americans at the turn of the last century 
were politically disfranchised and economically marginal.173  Conver-
sely, an important component of the opposition to Reynolds v. Sims,174 
the reapportionment decision, consisted of politicians, who wield 
enormous political power.  (Overrepresented rural dwellers also op-
posed Reynolds, though such groups were, by definition, a minority 
of the population.)   These politically influential critics of Reynolds 
nearly were able to secure a constitutional amendment overturning 
the decision.175  Yet, once that effort had failed, Reynolds quickly ge-
nerated its own powerful constituency of supporters: Politicians elec-
ted under the one-person-one-vote regime of Reynolds had a vested 
interest in defending that decision.176
Some constitutional issues fade away and others linger.  The 
Court’s prestige is not jeopardized by controversial or even unpo-
pular rulings on issues that quickly lose their saliency. For example, 
the public controversy over Dred Scott, which was intense in the late 
1850s,177  dissipated rapidly once the Civil War and post-war cons-
titutional amendments had abolished slavery and guaranteed black 
171 On this culturally elite bias of  judicial review, see Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 145, 188-92 (1998). 
172 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
173 See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 303. 
174 377 U.S. 533  (1964). 
175 David Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the United States Constitution, 1776-1995, at 374-76 (1996).
176 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 121 (1980) (“[T]he incentive of  elected representatives is not necessarily 
toward malapportionment but rather toward maintaining whatever apportionment, good or bad, it is that got and keeps 
them where they are.”). 
177 See supra note _.
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citizenship, thus rendering Dred Scott obsolete.  The Court’s rulings 
invalidating New Deal legislation in 1935 and 1936 suffered a similar 
fate.178  The immediate effect of these decisions was to produce a 
confrontation with the president that threatened the Court’s standing; 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan had the potential to destroy the Court 
as we know it.179 Yet once the Justices shifted constitutional gears–
constitutional historians continue to debate precisely when and why 
that shift occurred180–economic legislation quickly became immune 
from constitutional challenge.181 The issue that had provoked the 
Court-packing episode was obsolete within just a couple of years.182 
Likewise, the decision in Korematsu v. United States,183 sustaining the 
war-time internment of Japanese-Americans, already was generating 
considerable criticism by the end of the war,184 and soon would come 
to be regarded as a quintessential failure of judicial nerve.185  Yet, sin-
ce the underlying issue simply was not relevant to peacetime Ame-
rica, the decision did little lasting damage to the Court’s reputation. 
Other issues that generate Court decisions refuse to go away.  Abor-
tion and school prayer have remained at the center of public con-
troversy for well over a quarter of a century since the Court first put 
them on its constitutional agenda.186 Whether or not Roe and Engel 
have damaged the Court’s standing, it seems clear that controversial 
rulings on issues that have staying power pose a relatively greater 
threat to the Court’s reputation. 
178 See supra notes __. 
179 See Cushman, supra note __, at 13-14 (reporting statements by opponents of  the plan); Joseph Alsop & Turner 
Catledge, The 168 Days 107, 114-15 (1938) (same). 
180 Compare Cushman, supra note __ (denying that any fundamental shift occurred in 1937) with Bruce Ackerman, We 
the People: Transformations 366-68 (1998) (arguing there was a revolution in 1937).  See also Friedman, supra note __, at 
1982 (denying any “revolution” but conceding greater significance to Jones & Laughlin Steel than does Cushman). 
181 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
182 See generally Walton H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of  the Supreme Court, 50 Yale L.J. 
1319, 1340-41 & n.82 (1941) (collecting cases). 
183 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
184 See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases–A Disaster, 54 Yale L. J. 489 (1945); Nanette Dembitz, 
Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 Colum. L. 
Rev. 175 (1945). 
185 See, e.g., Judith A. Baer, Equality Under the Constitution: Reclaiming the Fourteenth Amendment 113, 149 (1983) 
(calling Korematsu “racist” and a “disgrace”); Michael Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 145 (1994) 
(calling the decision “almost universally discredited”); Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of  the Constitution Must the 
Law be Color-Blind?, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 201, 202 (1986) (calling it “infamous”).  
186 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (abortion); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000). 
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Just as the diminishing salience of an issue may affect the 
Court’s ability to weather a storm of public controversy, significant 
shifts in public opinion on issues that retain their salience may im-
pact the Court’s standing.  Brown v. Board of Education was intensely 
controversial in 1954, but was much less so by 1964, and by 1974 
enjoyed the overwhelming approval of Americans, black and whi-
te, North and South.187 Roe v. Wade, on the other hand, is nearly as 
controversial today as it was in 1973. Thus, the Court’s reputation 
may depend, to a significant degree, on the Justices’ skill at pre-
dicting the future.  Brown is the greatest judicial prognostication of 
all time.  The Justices rightly understood that a fundamental shift in 
race relations was in the offing.188 By acting as part of the vanguard 
of the civil rights movement, the Justices garnered substantial (in-
deed, somewhat exaggerated) credit for the transformation in race 
relations that ensued.189 Yet, public opinion does not always shift 
with the Court; it can move in the opposite direction as well.  Thus, 
a Court decision that is initially popular or that generates a mixed 
response can later become so universally criticized as to subject the 
Court to popular vilification.  Dred Scott and Plessy surely illustrate 
this phenomenon, and Korematsu may as well.190 Fortunately for 
the Court, dramatic shifts in public opinion that render the Court 
a target of public vituperation frequently occur on issues that the 
passage of time has rendered largely obsolete.  On such occasions, 
even nearly-universal public condemnation of its rulings seems to 
take little toll on the Court’s standing.  Within a decade or two of the 
187 See supra note __.  See also Muse, supra note __, at 211 (noting a dramatic increase by the early 1960s in the percent-
age of  southerners who believed school desegregation was inevitable); id. at 270-71 (noting a dramatic shift in national 
opinion on race by 1963).  
188 For the Justices’ perception that racial change was in the offing, see the statements quoted in Michael J. Klarman, 
Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 Geo. L.J. 433, 458 (1994)  (book review).  For the 
extralegal causes of  this change, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. 
L. Rev. 7, 13-75 (1994). 
189 For the debate over how much credit the Court deserves, compare Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live 
Brown!: The Endless Attempt to Canonize a Case, 80 Va. L. Rev. 161 (1994) (almost no credit) with David J. Garrow, 
Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of  Brown v. Board of  Education, 80 Va. L. Rev. 151 (1994) (tremendous 
credit) and Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of  Education: Facts and Political Correctness, 80 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1994) 
(indirect and moderate credit).
190 Dred Scott probably enjoyed majority support in the nation when decided.  See Fehrenbacher, supra note __, at 565-
66 (noting that Dred Scott seemed, if  anything, to help northern Democrats in the 1857 state elections).  Plessy was so 
consonant with public opinion that it went virtually unnoticed.  See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-
Historical 197 (1987); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive 
Era.  Part I: The Heyday of  Jim Crow, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 444, 469 (1982).  Korematsu was exactly what most Americans 
demanded during the war.  See Peter Irons, Justice at War (1983), ch.3.  For subsequent vilification of  these decisions, see 
the statements quoted in Klarman, Civil Rights,  25, 28. 
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decisions, few Americans were prepared to defend Dred Scott or (to a 
lesser extent) Korematsu.191 Yet, since the issues adjudicated in these 
cases had been rendered largely obsolete, the rulings became curio-
sities rather than irritants.  if this observation is correct, there may be 
a one-way ratchet of sorts at work with regard to controversial Court 
decisions on issues where a dramatic shift in public opinion subse-
quently occurs.  Apparently, the Justices receive enormous credit for 
correctly predicting the future, but not much blame for incorrectly 
predicting it, at least when the underlying issue quickly loses its sa-
lience.  Concretely, the Court’s heroic decision in Brown seems, in the 
public mind, vastly to outweigh ignoble judicial deeds such as Dred 
Scott, Plessy, Korematsu, and the like.192 
On other issues, public opinion changes, while the salience 
of the issue remains high.  in this category of cases, significantly, 
the Justices generally enjoy second chances to get their decisions 
right–that is, opportunities to reconsider their initial ruling, and if 
necessary, to revise or retract it, in light of hostile public opinion. 
Furman v. Georgia may be the best exemplar of this phenomenon.  in 
1972, Supreme Court Justices read the tea leaves of public opinion 
as indicating that capital punishment in the United States was on the 
road to extinction.193  Opinion polls in the mid-1960s revealed, for the 
first and (thus far) only time in American history, national pluralities 
opposed to capital punishment.194  A majority of the Justices decided 
to give the death penalty a nudge toward constitutional oblivion.195 
Yet, public opinion on the death penalty shifted dramatically in the 
191 On Korematsu, see, e.g., The Autobiography of  William O. Douglas: The Court Years, 1939-1975, at 280 (1980) 
(recanting his vote in Korematsu); Irons, supra note __, at 362 (noting a 1983 report to Congress by the Comission on 
Wartime Relocation, which concluded that the internment of  Japanese-Americans was a “grave injustice” resulting from 
“race prejudice”).  On Dred Scott, see Fehrenbacher, supra note __, at 573 (“as time passed, it [Dred Scott] was an embar-
rassment–the Court’s highly visible skeleton in a transparent closet”); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 273-74 (1901) 
(noting that the Civil War had “produced such changes in judicial, as well as public sentiment, as to seriously impair the 
authority of  that case”).  
192 Apparently, the myth of  the Court as countermajoritarian hero is just too attractive to resist.  See Klarman, Civil 
Rights, at 19-23. 
193 See Delavan Dickson, The Supreme Court in Conference: 1940-1985, at ?? (2001) (conference notes from Furman v. 
Georgia: Justice Brennan noting that support for abolition of  the death penalty has increased during the twentieth century; 
Justice Stewart predicting that “[s]omeday the Court will hold that death sentence is unconstitutional”).  See also Furman, 
408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (observing that the death penalty “has for all practical purposes run its 
course”); Jeffries, supra note __, at 413-14. 
194 See Jeffries, supra note __, at 406; Carole S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of  Constitutional Regulation of  Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 410 & n.273 (noting that in 1966 a 
Gallup poll, for the first time ever, revealed more Americans opposing than favoring the death penalty). 
195 See Jeffries, supra note __, at 413.
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mid-1970s, perhaps partly in reaction to the Court’s ruling.196  Within 
four years of Furman, thirty-five state legislatures had manifested their 
desire to retain the death penalty, by revising their statutes to take 
account of the objections raised in Furman.197  The Justices, plain-
ly influenced by this resounding popular endorsement of the death 
penalty,198 switched gears in 1976, sustaining the constitutionality of 
the death penalty, so long as administered in a suitably constrained 
manner.199  We know from subsequent experience in California that 
determined judicial resistance to implementation of the death penalty 
in the face of overwhelming popular approval can injure a court’s 
stature.200  The United States Supreme Court avoided incurring the 
public’s wrath because it took advantage of post-Furman opportu-
nities to align its death penalty jurisprudence with national opinion.
The so-called “switch in time” of 1937 likewise illustrates how 
the iterative quality of constitutional interpretation affords the Court 
opportunities to conserve its institutional prestige by adjusting or 
even retracting initially controversial decisions.  President Roosevelt 
threatened to destroy the Court in response to its 1936 decisions 
invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, and the New York minimum wage.201  The very next 
year, the Justices took advantage of opportunities to reconsider their 
position, and by doing so, helped ensure the defeat of Roosevelt’s 
Court-packing plan.202  Many commentators have interpreted Terry 
196 See Jeffries, supra note __, at 414 (reporting Gallup polls and concluding that the increase in public support for the 
death penalty after Furman was “so sharp that it seems almost certain to have been a negative reaction to the Court’s 
decision”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note __, at 411-12 (“it seems fair to say that Furman galvanized political opposition 
to abolition”). 
197 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jeffries, supra note __, at 414; Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note __, at 40. 
198 See Dickson, supra note __, at ?? (conference notes in Gregg v. Georgia: Justice Stewart noting that thirty-five legisla-
tures have revised their death penalty statutes since 1972, thus indicating that “evolving standards of  common decency” 
continue to support the death penalty; Justice Powell emphasizing the recent state statutes). 
199 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
200 See, e.g., Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judicial Elections, and the California 
Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of  the Debate, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809 (1986). 
201 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Morehead v. New York 
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
202 The relevant decisions are West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).  For the impact of  these decisions on 
the Court-packing plan, see Cushman, supra note __, at 18-23; Alsop & Catledge, supra note __, at 144-47.  Cushman, 
of  course, denies that these decisions represented, in any strong sense, “reconsideration” of  the decisions from the 
preceding term.  
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v. Ohio,203 which sustained police stop-and-frisk tactics even in the 
absence of probable cause, as a judicial (and judicious) concession 
to public opinion, which had been agitated by the Court’s decision 
in Miranda v. Arizona two years earlier.204  The apparent shift in the 
Court’s attitude toward time release programs for religious observan-
ce in public schools between 1948 and 1952205 and toward legislative 
investigation of alleged communists between 1957 and 1959206 li-
kewise may reflect the Justices’ recognition of the wisdom of making 
occasional concessions to adverse public opinion.
Finally, the Court’s standing and legitimacy are most at risk 
when it renders unpopular or controversial decisions in bunches, 
rather than individually.  The Court came under severe attack in the 
late 1950s–from Congress, the American Bar Association, the Confe-
rence of State Chief Justices, and legal academics–because it took on 
so many controversial causes simultaneously.207  Still reeling from the 
white South’s assault upon Brown, the Justices tempted fate by taking 
on the professional anti-Communists with its famous Red Monday de-
cisions of 1957,208 the law enforcement lobby with some forerunners 
of the 1960s criminal procedure revolution,209 and federalism affician-
dos with the beginnings of the habeas revolution.210  This was too 
many powerful constituencies to offend at once, and the Court was 
forced to backtrack in the late 1950s, rejecting the broadest implica-
tions of its Red Monday decisions in 1959211 and generally absenting 
203 392 U.S. 1 (1978). 
204 See, e.g., Tracy Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 1271, 1317-18 (1998). 
205 Compare McCollum v. Board of  Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating time release program) with Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (sustaining a slightly different time release program).  See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Civil 
Liberties and the Vinson Court 11-14 (1954) (attributing the shift to the Court’s “dispos[ition] to use any available method 
to quiet the storm caused by the McCollum decision”); Melvin I. Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court 
under Stone and Vinson, 1941-1953, at 236 (1997). 
206 Compare Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) and Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (placing 
constitutional limits on legislative investigations) with Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) and Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (narrowly construing those limits).  Murphy identies a “tactical withdrawal.”  Murphy, supra 
note __, at 246.  
207 See generally Murphy, supra note __, at 266 (arguing that the Warren Court made the mistake of  taking on “too many 
powerful enemies at one time”). 
208 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hamphsire, 354 U.S. 234 (1954);  Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).  These are discussed in Murphy, supra note __, at 100-06.  
209 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
210 See Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443  (1953).
211 See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).  These are discussed in 
Murphy, supra note __, at 229-31. 
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itself from the school desegregation controversy until after the civil 
rights movement had caught the country up with the Court.212  Likewi-
se, the New Deal Court got itself into trouble by invalidating a dozen 
federal statutes in no less than eighteen months.  Finally, a series of 
Marshall Court decisions between 1816 and 1824213 made the Court 
so unpopular in so many states that a genuine risk of congressional 
retaliation arose, either in the form of a statute curtailing the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction or a constitutional amendment fundamentally 
altering the judicial review power.214  Most scholars believe that the 
Marshall Court engaged in a strategic retreat during its final decade, in 
order to blunt these retaliatory efforts.215 
These seem to me the most important factors influencing how 
particular decisions impact the Court’s long term standing.  Evaluating 
the likely significance of Bush v. Gore according to these variables is 
straightforward, though necessarily no less impressionistic than identi-
fying the relevant factors in the first place.
Half the country–the half that voted for Al Gore–thinks the re-
sult in Bush v. Gore was wrong; many think it was egregiously so.216 
Some Republicans acknowledge (especially in private) that the Court’s 
decision was bad law, but generally they are not unhappy with the 
result.217  Thus, if I am right that the Court’s long-term legitimacy de-
pends more on whether people approve its results than on the qua-
lity of its legal reasoning, roughly half the country will approve and 
212 On the Court’s absenting itself  from the school desegregation controversy, see, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson, From 
Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 1954-1978 (1979), ch.5.  The Court did intervene, but only 
in extreme circumstances.  See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (defiance of  Brown, followed by school closures); Bush 
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (summarily affirming invalidation of  state statute authorizing closure of  
any school ordered to integrate).  The Court only reentered the fray as the civil rights movement reached its pinnacle. 
See Goss v. Board of  Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (invalidating minority-to-majority student transfer policy); Griffin v. 
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (invalidating school closures). 
213 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of  United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. 264 (1821); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
214 See, e.g., Warren, supra note __, ch. 17; Dwight Wiley Jessup, Reaction and Accommodation: The United States 
Supreme Court and Political Conflict 1809-1835, ch. 5 (1987). 
215 See, e.g., Jessup, supra note __, chs. 6-7; R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court Under Marshall and Taney 84-88 
(1968).  The leading cases in support of  the retreat hypothesis are Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 457 
(1831); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S.  (4 Pet.) 514 (1830); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 
(1829); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
216 See Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, “Public Backs Uniform U.S. Voting Rules,” Washington Post, Dec. 18, 2000, A1 
(reporting an opinion poll revealing that fifty percent of  the public approved of  the Supreme Court decision and forty-
eight percent disapproved); Montgomery, supra note __. 
217 See sources cited supra note __.  
49  R. EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro,  v. 20, n. 2, p. 8 - 53, Maio/Agosto 2018 
roughly half will condemn Bush.218  Yet, while nearly all Democrats 
criticize Bush, it is not clear how intense their opposition is.  Surely 
most Americans are more energized by presidential elections than 
by flag burning.  On the other hand, relatively few Gore supporters 
seem to have manifested an intensity of commitment for their can-
didate approaching that displayed by right-to-lifers in opposition to 
Roe v. Wade.  indeed, a principal reason that Gore found himself in 
the Florida predicament that he did–recall that all the political scien-
tists’ models predicted a relatively comfortable victory for him219–was 
the relative lack of enthusiasm evinced by many Democrats for their 
party’s candidate.220  Thus, one might surmise that many Democrats’ 
opposition to Bush v. Gore will be lukewarm at best.  My guess, thou-
gh, is that this supposition is mistaken.  The commitment of many 
Democrats to contesting the Florida election results was less a pro-
duct of their enthusiasm for their candidate than a reaction against 
what they regarded as the egregious misbehavior of Republicans du-
ring the election controversy.221  Once the Supreme Court defied the 
pundits’ predictions by involving itself in the election controversy,222 
Democratic resentment toward Republican politicians and Bush cam-
paign operatives easily was transferred to a conservative Supreme 
Court majority that appeared bent on doing the G.O.P.’s bidding.  My 
hunch is that even lukewarm Gore supporters were outraged by the 
result in Bush v. Gore.  Moreover, Bush proved to be one of the most 
218 See Kaiser, supra note __ (quoting legal historian Lawrence Friedman to the effect that “[t]he country is split 50-50 
politically, and they’re probably split 50-50 on this [Bush v. Gore]”); ibid. (quoting legal historian Howard Gillman to the 
effect that “[w]hat the court did was align itself  with half  the country against the other half ”).
219 See Robert G. Kaiser, “Academics Say It’s Elementary,” Washington Post, Aug. 31, 2000, p.A12 (noting that six of  
seven political scientists predicted Gore to win percentages ranging from 52.4% to 55.4% of  the vote for the two major 
parties, and the seventh predicted him to win 60.3%).  I guess the political scientists have some remodeling to do before 
the next election. 
220 See, e.g., Terry M. Neal, “Some Black Voters View Gore as the Lesser of  Two Evils,” Washington Post,  Oct. 29, 2000, 
A4 (noting doubts as to “whether Gore has generated the enthusiasm he needs among the Democrats’ most loyal con-
stituency [African-Americans]”). 
221 See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid & Michael Tackett, “Democratic Leaders Certify their Support for Gore,” Chicago Tribune, 
Nov. 28, 2000, p. 1 (noting Democratic anger over the tactics of  Republicans in Florida and quoting one Democratic con-
gressman observing that “[t]he actions of  some of  our more Republican partisans over the past few days have stiffened 
and strengthened the resolve of  the Democrats”).
222 See supra note __; Larry Lipman & Kathy Pruitt, “U.S. Supreme Court,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Nov. 25, 2000, 
7A (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision to hear Bush’s appeal came as a surprise”); Joan Biskupic, “Courts can’t 
Unravel all Election Snags,” USA Today, Nov. 17, 2000, 1A (predicting that “the black-robed nine in Washington will beg 
off ”); David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, “American Waits,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23, 2000, A24 (“Most legal experts 
agreed that there were long odds against Bush’s actually winning in the Supreme Court . . . .”).  But see Einer Elhauge, 
“Bush v. Florida,” New York Times, Nov. 20, 2000, A27 (stating that if  the Florida Supreme Court orders a manual recount, 
“no one should be surprised if  the U.S. Supreme Court steps in”). 
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efficacious decisions in the Court’s history.  The conservative majority 
ruled that the Florida manual recount must stop; Al Gore conceded 
the election within twenty-four hours.223  This efficacious a ruling, on 
this divisive an issue, is certain to generate tremendous resentment 
toward the Court. 
As to the relative power of the constituencies impacted by the 
Court’s decision, both Democrats and Republicans have plenty of 
political and economic clout in American society.  Thus, Bush v. Gore 
is not a case where the Court’s critics are relatively disadvantaged 
in the public relations battle that follows the ruling.  On the other 
hand, it is hard to think of a constitutional issue that is more destined 
to become obsolete.  George W. Bush will be president, possibly 
as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling, for four years.  (If he ser-
ves eight years, an intervening independent cause–a second electoral 
victory–will greatly reduce the Court’s responsibility for the second 
term.)  There is unlikely to be another presidential election like this 
past one during the lifetime of anyone now living.  Moreover, the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Bush, by design, will have implications for no 
other constitutional issue, but rather is destined to be treated by the 
Court as a decision “good for this day and train only.”224  Memories of 
what most Democrats will regard as the judicial theft of a presidential 
election will survive, but they will be just that–memories.  Bush’s pre-
sence in the White House for four years will constitute a short term 
reminder of the Court’s decision.  But this is not like the abortion 
issue, which just won’t go away, and thus serves as a constant remin-
der to right-to-lifers of Supreme Court decisions like Roe and Casey.
On the other hand, unlike with regard to an issue like racial 
segregation, where public opinion transformed over time, popular at-
titudes toward Bush v. Gore probably never will change very much. 
Democrats are likely always to believe that the Supreme Court interve-
ned in the 2000 presidential election because the conservative Justices 
223 One can only marvel at the enormous prestige of  an institution that could command such total obedience to such a 
lawless decision.  Imagine how different the reaction of  the Jeffersonians would have been two hundred years earlier had 
counterfactual litigation resulted in a Federalist Supreme Court awarding victory to John Adams (or Aaron Burr) in the 
disputed presidential election of  1800. The Marshall Court was too intimidated by the Jefferson administration even to 
order the Secretary of  State to deliver commissions to justices of  the peace appointed by outgoing President Adams.  See 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  The idea of  that Court attempting to adjudicate the results of  a presi-
dential election–and having anyone pay attention to its determination, should it dare to do so–is simply incomprehensible.
224 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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preferred George W. Bush for president.225  Perhaps some attitudes will 
change if Bush proves to be a particularly good or bad president,226 
but i doubt it.  Moreover, unlike with regard to issues like the death 
penalty, the Supreme Court almost certainly will enjoy no future op-
portunities to revisit the issue in Bush, as it did in  Furman, and thus to 
fix its “mistake.”  Once elected president, Bush cannot be “unelected.”
Finally, from the “basket of issues” perspective, the Rehnquist 
Court might survive Bush v. Gore reasonably unscathed, because the 
remainder of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has been such 
a political grab bag of results.  Bush might have enraged Democrats 
even more had the conservative majority that ensured Bush’s election 
been consistently writing conservative values into the Constitution. 
But it hasn’t.  While the Rehnquist Court arguably has been the most 
activist in history, its activism does not manifest a consistent political 
valence.  in recent years, liberals generally have won on issues in-
volving abortion, school prayer, gender discrimination, and freedom 
of  speech.227  Conservatives, on the other hand, have triumphed on 
issues such as affirmative action, minority voting districts, public aid 
to parochial schools, federalism, the death penalty, and (usually) cri-
minal procedure.228  indeed, in the term that immediately preceded 
Bush, the Court issued a series of important constitutional rulings 
that were noteworthy mainly for the political evenhandedness of the 
results.229  Liberals won on abortion rights, access to abortion clinics, 
school prayer, and the continued vitality of Miranda.230  Conservatives 
225 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, “A Muddled Ruling,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 14, 2000, A26 (“Many of  the vice-
president’s supporters will continue to believe–probably to their graves–that their man would have won if  only they had 
been given more time.”). 
226 See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note __ (reporting former White House counsel A.B. Culvahouse’s view that if  Bush is a suc-
cessful president, “lots of  people” may end up approving the Court’s ruling). 
227 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of  Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (school prayer); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (exclusion of  women from Virginia 
Military Institute); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning). 
228 See, e.g., City of  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (affirmative action); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993) (minority voting districts); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)  (public aid to parochial schools); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (federalism); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (death penalty); Michigan Dep’t of  State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints permissible under the fourth amendment). 
229 See, e.g., Edward Walsh, “An Activist Court Mixes its High-Profile Message,” Washington Post, July 2, 2000, A6; Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, “A Court Not Easy to Classify,” New York Times, June 29, 2000, A31 (“[I]n the rich and important term 
that just finished today, the justices defied any simple political typecasting.”). 
230 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (abortion); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (abortion clinics); United 
States v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (affirming Miranda); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) 
(school prayer);
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won on several important federalism issues, public aid to parochial 
schools, and the first amendment rights of organizations that discri-
minate against gays.231  Perhaps Democratic ire over Bush v. Gore is 
somewhat ameliorated by the Rehnquist Court’s continuing propen-
sity to distribute a substantial share of constitutional victories to libe-
rals.  imagine how differently conservatives might have reacted to a 
counterfactual Warren Court ruling in 1968 handing the presidential 
election to Hubert Humphrey.
Where does consideration of these various factors leave us in 
evaluating the likely impact of Bush v. Gore on the Court’s long term 
legitimacy?  Roughly half the nation probably will believe for the 
indefinite future that the Supreme Court stole a presidential election 
from their candidate.  Yet, after a brief four years has passed, Bush v. 
Gore will become an unhappy memory rather than a constant irritant. 
Thus, Bush seems unlikely to harm the Court’s standing very much, 
especially if the Justices’ constitutional jurisprudence continues to 
manifest the uneven political valence that it has in recent years.  
The one confident prediction that can be made is that the Sena-
te confirmation hearings of future Supreme Court nominees are likely 
to resemble a war zone.232  This already has been true much of the 
time since the late 1960s; consider the fierce battles over the nomi-
nations of Justice Abe Fortas (for promotion to Chief Justice), Judge 
Clement Haynesworth and Harold Carswell, Judge Robert Bork, and 
Justice Clarence Thomas.233  And, really, why should we not expect it 
to be so, as the Supreme Court increasingly has asserted jurisdiction 
over the issues that comprise today’s culture wars?  Now that the 
Justices not only make national policy on abortion, school prayer, 
and affirmative action, but they also pick presidents, the stakes of 
231 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (public aid to parochial schools); Boy Scouts of  America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000) (first amendment right to exclude gays). United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating Violence 
Against Women Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of  Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating congressional imposition of  dam-
ages liability upon states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
232 See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note __ (reporting legal historian Howard Gillman’s view that Bush is likely to affect the 
appointments process for Supreme Court Justices); Stephen Fidler, “U.S. Election: The Final Chapter,” Financial Times 
(London), Dec. 14, 2000, p.12 (reporting similar views of  Professors A.E. Dick Howard and Stephen Wermeil); Scot 
Lehigh, “So, Class, What Have We Learned? Were the Bush-Gore Lessons Lasting or was it Just Another Battle?,” Boston 
Globe, Dec. 17, 2000, C1 (quoting political scientist Nelson Polsby predicting a “terrible confirmation battle” over Bush’s 
first Supreme Court nomination).  
233 See Ethan Bronner,  Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America (1989); John Paul Frank, Clement 
Haynsworth, the Senate, and the Supreme Court (1991); Laura Kalman, Abe Fortas: A Biography  (1990); Jane Mayer & 
Jill Abramson, Strange Justice: The Selling of  Clarence Thomas (1994).
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a Supreme Court appointment–especially on this evenly-divided 
Court–will be ratcheted that much higher.  This battlefield scenario is 
especially likely to unfold when President George W. Bush makes his 
first nomination to the Court.  Since most Democrats believe that the 
Court’s intervention to make Bush president was illegitimate, they are 
sure to scrutinize with exacting care his efforts to reshape the Court 
in his political image.  While Democrats proved powerless to prevent 
the Court from picking the president, they may have greater success, 
especially in this evenly-divided Senate, at preventing the president 
from picking the Court.v
